



Research on Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) in Armenia


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
Final Report

July 2024



Abbreviations

CFAA	Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
CSO	Civil Society Organization
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
GPC	Gender Policy Council
EU	European Union
FG	Focus Group
ICA	Interstate Communications Act
VAW	Violence Against Women
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SME	Small and Medium-Sized Entrepreneurship
TFGBV	Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence
VAWA	Violence Acts Against Women




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
ABSTRACT

This research investigates technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV), laying a special emphasis on its prevalence in the context of Armenian businesses and e-commerce and addressing a critical and emerging threat to the safety of individuals, particularly women and girls. TFGBV includes a range of harmful digital behaviors such as cyberstalking, cyberbullying, image-based abuse, and sextortion, which are not properly addressed by the existing Armenian laws. The study critically analyzes Armenian legislation, identifying significant gaps and comparing it with international best practices to highlight areas for improvement. The absence of a clear definition of TFGBV and official statistics are identified as major barriers to effective policy development. The research offers recommendations for legislative reform and enhanced support systems to protect women both online and offline, advocating for comprehensive measures to improve online safety. Through its findings, the study emphasizes the urgent need for policy enhancements that align with global standards to better safeguard and empower women, including those engaged in entrepreneurship.




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Executive Summary

In exploring TFGBV, the research highlights the critical gaps in Armenian laws which primarily focus on traditional forms of abuse, neglecting the complexities of digital platforms. This oversight leaves victims of TFGBV without adequate legal protection, underscoring the urgent need for reforms informed by global best practices to safeguard women both online and offline. The study also identifies the lack of official statistics and a concrete definition of TFGBV as significant barriers to effective policy development and intervention efforts.

The analysis delves into various forms of TFGBV, including online harassment (cyberstalking and cyberbullying), image-based abuse, coercive behavior (such as sextortion), and online impersonation. By examining international best practices and comparing them with Armenian legislation, the research highlights key areas for improvement. The findings emphasize the necessity for comprehensive measures to enhance online safety, improved platform accountability, and robust support systems to protect and empower all women, including entrepreneurs.

1. Summary of Key Findings

The current report outlines various forms of TFGBV. By closely examining and analyzing different legislations, reports, articles, and publications related to this issue in five initially chosen countries, TFGBV laws and regulations were categorized as demonstrated in Annex A.

In many cases, laws and regulations addressing TFGBV fall under online harassment (which includes cyberstalking and cyberbullying), image-based abuse, coercive behavior (like sextortion), and online impersonation. After studying international best practices, the Armenian legislation was analyzed, and key gaps were identified.

Armenian laws currently focus on traditional forms of abuse and fail to address digital platforms' complexities, leaving victims of TFGBV without adequate legal protection. This underscores the urgent need for reforms informed by global best practices to safeguard women both online and offline. Additionally, the lack of official statistics and a concrete definition of TFGBV hampers effective policy development and intervention efforts.

The survey analysis highlights the pervasive nature of TFGBV and its profound impacts on women's personal and professional lives. Women of all ages, especially younger ones, experience online targeting, with social networks being the primary platform for such harassment. Despite attempts at protection through reporting and seeking support, challenges like fear of retaliation

and inadequate mechanisms persist. The findings underscore the urgent need for comprehensive measures to enhance online safety, emphasizing improved platform accountability and robust support systems to protect and empower all women, including those who are entrepreneurs.

Overview of TFGBV

2. TFGBV as a Form of Gender-Based Violence

Nowadays, the wide use of technology has transformed the dynamics of human interaction, changing the way people communicate, collaborate, and navigate the world around them. While these advancements have undoubtedly brought about numerous benefits, they have also had significant impacts on gender equality and women's rights. These impacts include exacerbating existing forms of violence against women (VAW) and giving rise to new forms, such as TFGBV.

TFGBV is a worrying trend, which involves using digital platforms and communication tools to harass, control, or harm individuals. It encompasses any act carried out or magnified through digital tools or technologies causing physical, sexual, psychological, social, political, or economic harm to women and girls due to their gender¹.

According to numerous reports and studies, a wide array of behaviors falls under the umbrella of TFGBV. These behaviors encompass various forms of harassment, abuse, and exploitation that leverage digital platforms and communication technologies. Commonly recognized types of TFGBV include but are not limited to:

Doxxing	Refers to sharing personal and sensitive information, such as home and work addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, and family names without permission.
Cybermob	Refers to a large group of online attackers who collectively threaten, insult, and verbally abuse a target, often in a coordinated and organized manner.
Image-based abuse	Involves the use of imagery, typically of a sexual nature, to objectify, exploit, humiliate, or harass individuals. Examples include the non-consensual sharing of intimate imagery, also known as non-consensual porn, and the dissemination of child sexual abuse material, depicting minors in sexually explicit situations.
Online Impersonation	Involves creating a fake online profile and assuming someone else's identity for malicious purposes, which may include damaging someone's reputation or threatening their safety.
Sextortion	Refers to a form of electronic blackmail where the perpetrator demands money, sexual favors, or additional explicit images in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information.
Cyberstalking	Entails persistently surveilling, contacting, and pursuing an individual through technological means, often without their consent. Cyberstalking has the potential to escalate into offline stalking and vice versa.
Cyberbullying	Involves the intentional and repetitive use of digital platforms to cause harm to an individual, typically by damaging their self-esteem and psychological well-being.

¹ <https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/faqs/tech-facilitated-gender-based-violence>

Online harassment	Encompasses repetitive actions aimed at threatening, pestering, frightening, or abusing someone through the transmission of degrading, offensive, or insulting comments or images.
Shallowfake or deepfake	A shallowfake is a form of media manipulation, often created using basic editing software, where someone's face is put onto another person's body. Deepfake uses sophisticated AI and ML algorithms to create very realistic fake images or videos by swapping faces or altering content. It's much more convincing than shallowfakes ² .

The aforementioned terms will serve as the foundational vocabulary throughout the entire study.

² <https://www.unfpa.org/thevirtualisreal-background#glossary>

Research Methodology

3. Overview of Research Components

The research was conducted through a structured multi-phase approach, as illustrated below:

Figure 4.1. Research components



1. Legislation Analysis

The first phase involved a thorough analysis of the existing Armenian legislation and policy frameworks pertaining to TFGBV. This component aimed to:

- Evaluate the existing laws: Assess the comprehensiveness and effectiveness of current laws and policies in addressing TFGBV.
- Identify gaps: Pinpoint areas where current legislation falls short in protecting individuals from digital forms of violence.
- Compare international standards: Conduct a comparative analysis of Armenian laws against international standards and best practices to highlight discrepancies and potential improvements.

2. Online Survey

The second phase consisted of conducting an online survey targeting women and girls, including women entrepreneurs in Armenia. The survey aimed to:

- Assess prevalence and impact of different types of TFGBV.
- Identify perceptions and survivors' experiences regarding TFGBV.

3. Focus Groups and Interviews

The final phase of the research involved conducting focus groups and interviews with key stakeholders, including women in business, NGOs and other key stakeholder agencies.

4. Research Methodology

4.1. Legislation Analysis


The study includes a comprehensive review and analysis of existing local legislation, regulations, policies, tools, and formal mechanisms related to TFGBV, particularly in the context of businesses and e-commerce.

Additionally, the desk research incorporates an examination of best international practices on TFGBV legislation and regulations, particularly from three selected EU countries, as well as the United States and Canada.

The EU countries selected for studying legislative practices were determined based on internationally recognized gender indices and scores, particularly the Gender Equality Index, the Gender Gap Index, and the Women, Business and Law score.

In an audit carried out by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the Gender Equality Index was acknowledged as a reliable measurement tool for gender equality in the European Union. According to the Gender Equality Index 2023, Sweden emerges as a frontrunner, scoring 82.2 points out of 100 (see Figure 5.1.1).

Figure 5.1.1. Gender Equality Index 2023, top 10 countries and EU average³



This score exceeds the EU average by 12.0 points. Following closely behind, the Netherlands (77.9 points) and Denmark (77.8 points) also demonstrate strong performances, positioning themselves above the EU average by 7.7 and 7.6 points respectively⁴.

Another global assessment, the Women, Business, and Law 2023 score, highlights ongoing efforts to advance gender equality through legal frameworks⁵. The

Women, Business, and the Law initiative critically evaluates the impact of domestic laws and regulations on women's economic opportunities, advocating for reforms to eliminate discriminatory practices and barriers to women's participation in the workforce.

Based on the rankings from internationally recognized gender indices mentioned above, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands have been selected for studying regulations and laws related to gender-based violence, with a particular focus on TFGBV.

After reviewing the best international practices, potential areas of improvement applicable to the Armenian context were identified, and a localization strategy for these international best practices was suggested. The desk research serves as a foundation for understanding the current legislative

³ Source: European Institute for Gender Equality, <https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index/2023/compare-countries>

⁴ Gender Equality index 2023, <https://eige.europa.eu/publications-resources/publications/gender-equality-index-2023-towards-green-transition-transport-and-energy>

⁵ Women, Business and the Law 2023, <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b60c615b-09e7-46e4-84c1-bd5f4ab88903/content>

and policy landscape, identifying gaps, and evaluating the effectiveness of current preventive measures and support systems.

4.2. Quantitative and Qualitative Data

A mixed methodology was employed to provide a robust framework for investigating and addressing TFGBV in businesses and e-commerce, combining the strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research methods.

The quantitative data was collected through the **online survey**, which was distributed to participants through the Safe YOU mobile application. The survey questionnaire (see Annex B) was specifically developed to gather data for this study.

The questions of the online survey include the following topics:

- General demographics,
- The awareness and understanding of the users of the TFGBV as a form of violence and the need for its reporting,
- The experience of the users referring to cases of TFGBV,
- The experience of the users referring to online safety issues in the context of business and entrepreneurial activities.

The qualitative data was collected through interviews and online focus group discussions with stakeholders in target cities (Yerevan, Gyumri, and Vanadzor). Three focus group discussions have been conducted, employing open-ended questions to explore stakeholders' perceptions of TFGBV in business environments.

Focus Group Target Groups

The main target groups and stakeholders for the research are listed as follows:

- **Focus Group 1** | Women in business (agriculture, tourism, etc.) including women-led SMEs from 3 target cities.
- **Focus Group 2** | Key Stakeholder Agencies, Interest Groups, NGOs and CSOs, and other relevant organizations with the responsibility or interest in addressing TFGBV, gender equity, and women's economic engagement.
- **Focus Group 3** | Businesses operating in digital space.

Interviews

To complement the desk research results, 4 separate interviews were conducted with representatives from:

- The Human Trafficking and Women's Issues Division of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
- Human Rights Defender's Office
- Juvenile Delinquency and Domestic Violence Prevention Department of Police of the RA Ministry of Internal Affairs

- Department of Investigation of Cybercrime and High Technology Crime of General Department of Investigation of Particularly Important Cases of the RA Investigative Committee.

Qualitative data analysis | A thematic analysis was conducted using the transcripts of the focus group discussions and insights gathered from interviews.

Quantitative data analysis | Statistical methods like Crosstab and Factor Analysis were used to analyze survey responses, calculating frequencies, percentages, and other relevant measures aimed at identifying prevalent forms of TFGBV and assess the effectiveness of current preventive measures and support systems. Survey responses were analyzed through Excel and SPSS software.

Key findings | Based on the analysis of the legislative and policy review both on local and international levels, as well as the results of the primary research, including the survey and the focus group discussions, key findings were developed.

Regulations and Legislation

5. International Best Practices

5.1. Canadian Legislative Framework

In Canada, several sections of the Criminal Code are pertinent to addressing TFGBV, particularly in cases involving the dissemination of intimate images or defamatory content online.

In Canada's Criminal Code⁶:

- **SECTION 162**| Prohibits knowingly distributing or advertising intimate images without consent, punishable by imprisonment for up to five years.
- **SECTION 184**| Outlines the legal consequences for individuals who knowingly intercept private communications using any electronic, acoustic, mechanical or similar device, punishable by up to five years' imprisonment.
- **SECTION 264**| Prohibits harassment that causes a person to fear for their safety or the safety of others known to them. The prohibited conduct includes repeatedly following someone or others known to them, repeatedly communicating with someone or others known to them, besetting or watching the dwelling, workplace, business, or any place where the person or anyone known to them resides, works, carries on business, or happens to be, and engaging in threatening conduct directed at the person or any member of their family. Such harassment is punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment.
- **SECTION 298**| Defines defamatory libel as publishing matter likely to harm a person's reputation, punishable by imprisonment. According to Section 300, publishing false defamatory libel is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Section 301 addresses the publication of defamatory libel, which is punishable by imprisonment for up to two years.
- **SECTION 346**| Addresses exerting pressure on another person through threats, usually to get them to do something and is subject to imprisonment for up to five years.
- **SECTION 372 (1)** | Pertains to sending messages with fraudulent intent, punishable by imprisonment for up to five years.
- **SECTION 372 (2,3)** | Pertains to indecent and unwanted communication. Everyone who commits an offence under this section is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years; or guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.
- **SECTION 403**| Prohibits the fraudulent personation of another person, punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years.
- **SECTION 423**| Anyone who wrongfully seeks to compel another person to either refrain from exercising their lawful rights or to engage in actions they have the right to avoid commits a criminal offense. This offense is punishable as either an indictable offense, with imprisonment for a maximum of five years, or as a summary conviction offense. Every person convicted of an offense punishable on summary conviction is liable to a fine of not more than \$5,000, or

⁶ Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/index.html>

to a term of imprisonment of not more than two years less a day, or to both (C-46, Section 787(1))⁷.

“Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act”, enacted in 2014, further enhances protections against online crime and improves the legal framework to address various issues related to cybercrime.⁸ Specifically, the amendments made by this act target modern challenges, such as online fraud, identity theft, and cyberbullying, and represents Canada’s efforts to adapt its legal framework to the evolving nature of criminal activities. The amendment creates new provisions for removing intimate images from the internet, recovery of expenses for removal, and restrictions on computer and internet use by offenders.

The enactment of this act renders nonconsensual distribution of intimate images illegal. Furthermore, the law encompasses cases where the perpetrator threatens to disseminate the images/videos. Penalties for such offenses can result in imprisonment for up to five years

“Protecting Victims of Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act, RSA 2017, c.P-26.9” enacted in Alberta, Canada also aims to address the issue of non-consensual distribution of intimate images. In this context, an "intimate image" refers to a visual recording of a person made by any means, including a photograph, film, or video recording. The act prohibits the distribution of intimate images without consent, treating it as a tort against the victim. It is important to note that the victim can take legal action without proving damages. Besides, the act maintains privacy rights for victims who initially consented to image recording but not distribution: consenting to the creation of the image does not automatically imply consent for its distribution to others. Therefore, if someone distributes such an image without the subject’s consent, it would still be considered a violation of their privacy rights under the act.

According to **The Defamation Act, RSY 2002, c.52**, a person can sue for defamation without needing to prove special damage or harm⁹.

The Privacy Act is a piece of legislation outlined in Chapter P-24 of The Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan. Since its enactment, it has been amended several times, including by the Statutes of Saskatchewan in 1979 (c.69), 2004 (c.L-16.1), 2018 (c.28), and 2022 (c.29). This act governs matters related to the protection of individuals’ privacy rights, including the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by public bodies in Saskatchewan, Canada. According to the act:

- It is considered a tort, “actionable without proof of damage, for a person to willfully violate the privacy of another person without any claim of right” (c.373).

⁷ Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/c-46/section-787.html>

⁸ Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act, S.C. 2014,

Available: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/annualstatutes/2014_31/fulltext.html

⁹ Defamation Act, RSY 2002,

Available: <https://www.canlii.org/en/yk/laws/stat/rsy-2002-c-52/latest/rsy-2002-c-52.html?resultIndex=2>

- The act provides examples of actions that constitute a violation of privacy, including auditory or video surveillance of a person by any means, recording conversations without consent, using a person's name or likeness for commercial gain without consent, or using personal documents without consent.
- In an action for violation of privacy, the court has the authority to provide appropriate remedies, including: Awarding damages to compensate the plaintiff for harm suffered, granting an injunction to prohibit further privacy violations, ordering the defendant to account for any profits gained from the violation, and requiring the defendant to surrender any articles or documents obtained through the violation.

The act also contains provisions regarding the non-consensual distribution of intimate images, majority of which is the same as outlined in aforementioned "Protecting Victims of Non-consensual Distribution of Intimate Images Act".

The non-consensual distribution of intimate images is highly regulated in Canada, with several provinces having enacted specific legislation to address these issues. One of them is the **Intimate Image Protection Act, Manitoba Province**¹⁰, which states that the defendant must prove that they had reasonable grounds to believe they had consent to distribute the image when it was distributed.

The Act Respecting the Unauthorized Distribution of Intimate Images and Protection Against Cyber-bullying provides additional penalties and enforcement mechanisms for the non-consensual distribution of intimate images and cyber-bullying, including: an order prohibiting the person from distributing the intimate image, an order prohibiting the person from making communications that would be cyber-bullying, or any other form of contact; an order requiring the person to take down or disable access to an intimate image or communication, an order referring the matter to dispute-resolution services provided by the agency or otherwise.

Other examples of regulation can be found in the **Act Respecting the Protection of Intimate Images, Newfoundland and Labrador**, and **Intimate Images Protection Act, Prince Edward Island**. These acts contain the same provisions.

While analysing Canada's Criminal Code, as well as provincial and territorial statutes, several key commonalities could be found:

- Recognition of the serious harm caused by the non-consensual distribution of intimate images.
- Prohibition of distribution of intimate images without the explicit consent of the individual depicted in the image.
- Provision of legal remedies for victims, such as civil actions for damages, injunctions, and other forms of relief.
- Imposition of criminal penalties for offenders, including fines and imprisonment in some cases.

¹⁰ The Intimate Image Protection Amendment Act, S.M. 2023

<https://web2.gov.mb.ca/laws/statutes/2023/c02323.php?lang=en#>

Key differences among provincial statutes are mostly regarding penalties and enforcement mechanisms: while some laws focus on civil remedies, others involve criminal prosecution with varying degrees of severity in penalties. However, the common goal of these laws is to protect individuals' privacy and autonomy by prohibiting the non-consensual distribution of intimate images and holding offenders accountable for their actions.

5.2. USA Legislative Framework

In 2023, first-ever U.S. **National Plan to End Gender Based Violence** was released. With this plan, the Federal Government aims to advance a comprehensive approach to preventing and addressing sexual violence, intimate partner violence, stalking, and other forms of gender-based violence. The document describes GBV as a a public safety and public health crisis, affecting urban, suburban, rural, and Tribal communities in the United States.¹¹

On March 8, 2021, International Women's Day, President Biden issued Executive Order 14020, on the Establishment of the White House Gender Policy Council (GPC), creating the first freestanding policy council within the Executive Office of the President focused on advancing gender equity and equality in both domestic and foreign policy.

The strategy outlines that prevention is an essential component of eliminating GBV. A set of policy and programmatic actions are proposed that address root causes, social norms, prevention and early intervention. The National Plan identifies seven strategic pillars undergirding the government-wide approach to preventing and addressing GBV.

- **Prevention**
- **Support, healing, safety, and well-being**
- **Economic security and housing stability**
- **Online safety**
- **Legal and justice systems**
- **Emergency preparedness and crisis response**
- **Research and data**

One of the Biden-Harris administration goals was to establish a strategic vision and coordinated approach for how the government addresses online forms of GBV, this strategy includes:

- Improving coordination among federal agencies and departments to strengthen the Federal Government's effectiveness in preventing and addressing TFGBV.
- Update federal surveys and data collection efforts on GBV to incorporate measures for TFGBV, including different forms of online abuse.

¹¹ The White House. U.S. National Plan to End Gender-Based Violence: Strategies for Action. May 2023.

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/National-Plan-to-End-GBV.pdf>

- Increase access to survivor-centered services, information, and support for victims who experience TFGBV through training and assistance for victim advocates, law enforcement, and the criminal legal system.

In 1994, the United States Congress passed the first comprehensive package of legislation aimed at preventing violent acts against women.¹² **Violence Acts Against Women (VAWA)** addresses various forms of gender-based violence, including domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking. In the following decades, VAWA was reauthorized four times: in 2000, 2005, 2013, and 2022. The 2022 reauthorization strengthens this law, including by:

- Establishing a federal civil cause of action for individuals whose intimate visual images are disclosed without their consent, allowing a victim to recover damages and legal fees; creating a new National Resource Center on Cybercrimes Against Individuals; and supporting State, Tribal, and local government efforts to prevent and prosecute cybercrimes, including cyberstalking and the nonconsensual distribution of intimate images.

In the U.S., 48 states and the District of Columbia **have Laws Against Nonconsensual Distribution of Intimate Images**. These laws criminalize the act of knowingly distributing private, sexually explicit images of another person without their consent. However, the legal framework in the country greatly varies by state. Some states classify nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos as a misdemeanor, while others treat it as a felony offense. Unlike Canada, which has comprehensive national laws specifically targeting nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos, the U.S. doesn't have federal legislation that specifically addresses this issue.

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) prohibits unauthorized access to computer systems, which may apply to cases of online impersonation involving hacking or unauthorized use of accounts. Additionally, **Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act** criminalized identity theft and the misuse of personal information. **The Interstate Communications Act (ICA)** prohibits the transmission of threatening communications across state lines. Federal prosecutors may use these laws to pursue charges against individuals engaged in interstate sextortion schemes or those who use electronic means to facilitate their crimes. Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, makes it unlawful for anyone to knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to commit, or otherwise promote, carry on, or facilitate any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law or a felony under State or local law.

In 2022, the governments of the U.S. and the Kingdom of Denmark launched the Global Partnership for Action on Gender-Based Online Harassment and Abuse (the Global Partnership), which is an effort for coordinating action to address TFGBV. Now, the partnership is a 12-country coalition and includes Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Iceland, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is working alongside a multi-sectoral advisory group that brings evidence-based and coordinated solutions, principles,

¹² The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Updated December 7, 2000

Available: <https://mainweb-v.musc.edu/vawprevention/policy/vawa.shtml>

and policies to address the issue of TFGBV. Its objectives include developing and advancing shared principles, increasing targeted programming and resources, and expanding access to reliable, comparable data¹³.

5.3. Sweden Legislative Framework

Legislation in Sweden generally does not differentiate domestic violence from violence in other societal domains, or between crimes by the sex of the perpetrator or the victim. The gender-based crime “gross violation of a woman’s integrity” is an exception, as it also exists in the gender-neutral form, “gross violation of integrity”. If murder, coercion, or deprivation of freedom are committed by a man against a woman to whom he is or has been married, or with whom he has been cohabiting under circumstances similar to marriage, he is instead guilty of gross violation of a woman’s integrity. The provision is intended to increase the penal value of offences, which together constitute a serious violation of a woman’s integrity. This is often the case regarding domestic violence. Alongside this specific provision¹⁴, crimes such as assault, murder, and sexual crimes, including rape, may of course also apply.

In the Swedish Criminal Code¹⁵:

- **SECTION 4J** Focuses on unlawful coercion. The provision states that coercion through violence or threat of violence, threat of a criminal act, and prosecution or reporting constitutes unlawful coercion. In the context of TFGBV, this could include threats of physical harm made through digital means, such as threatening messages or explicit images sent to coerce someone into a particular action or to intimidate them.
- **SECTION 6AJ** Addresses the offense of intrusive photography, particularly when it involves unlawfully recording images of individuals in private spaces. In the context of TFGBV, this could include cases where perpetrators use hidden cameras or spyware on electronic devices to record intimate moments without the victim’s consent, potentially for the purpose of harassment, coercion, or exploitation. The law stipulates penalties of fines or imprisonment for up to two years for those found guilty.
- **SECTION 6BJ** Pertains to the unauthorized use of another person’s identity data to pass oneself off as that person. This includes identity theft or impersonation online to harass, defame, or deceive others based on their gender.
- **SECTION 6CJ** Addresses the dissemination of sensitive personal information or images without consent, particularly those related to a person’s sexual life, health, victimization, vulnerability, or nudity. This offense could encompass actions such as non-consensual

¹³ 2022 Global Symposium on Technology-facilitated Gender-based Violence Results: Building a Common Pathway, Wilson Center, UNFRA, 2022

Available: https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/2022-GlobalSymposium-TFGBV_EN.pdf

¹⁴ Combating violence against women, Sweden, European Institute for Gender Equity

Available: https://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2016.5495_mh0216777enn_pdfweb_20170215100606.pdf

¹⁵ The Swedish Criminal Code, 1 January 1965

Available: <https://www.government.se/contentassets/7a2dcae0787e465e9a2431554b5eab03/the-swedish-criminal-code.pdf>

distribution of intimate images, disclosure of someone’s health status, or sharing private information about a person’s experiences of abuse or vulnerability.

- **SECTION 9A]** Prohibits the covert interception of speech or conversations using technical devices without the consent of parties involved, stipulates penalties or fines or imprisonment for up to two years for those found guilty.

Sweden has a strong legal framework for gender equality and combatting violence against women. It’s also worth noting that Sweden introduced one of the first data protection laws in the world in 1973 with the introduction of **the Data Act**.¹⁶ Since 25 May 2018, the principal data protection legislation in the EU has been Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR). In Sweden, the Data Protection Act and the Data Protection Regulation supplement the GDPR. There are also several sector-specific legislations which impact data protection, for example, the Criminal Data Act and the Camera Surveillance Act. Processing of personal data is lawful only if, and to the extent that, it is permitted under EU data protection law.

According to the Camera Surveillance Act, it is not allowed to use video surveillance outside of one’s own home or property.¹⁷ If video surveillance is used to monitor areas outside of one’s own home or property, the person needs to comply with the rules of the GDPR and the Swedish Camera Surveillance Act.

There is also a specific law that prohibits discrimination, called **the Discrimination Act**.¹⁸ This law prohibits employers, organisations, and education providers from treating some people worse than others. The law prohibits discrimination on such grounds as sex, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, ethnicity, etc. In the context of gender-based discrimination and violence, the relevant provisions are:

- **PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT]** This law prohibits employers from discriminating against employees, job applicants, trainees, or temporary workers based on various grounds, including gender. Discrimination in the form of inadequate accessibility is also addressed. This means that employers are obligated to prevent and address harassment and discrimination experienced by employees, including online harassment or cyberbullying based on gender.
- **OBLIGATION TO INVESTIGATE AND TAKE MEASURES AGAINST HARASSMENT]** Employers are required to investigate allegations of harassment or sexual harassment in the workplace and take appropriate measures to prevent future occurrences. Employers would need to address instances of TFGBV by employees, trainees, or temporary workers.

The law also entails that work on active measures is to be conducted continuously. Active measures are aimed at preventing discrimination and promoting equal rights and opportunities for

¹⁶ https://gdprhub.eu/Data_Protection_in_Sweden

¹⁷ <https://www.imy.se/en/individuals/camera-surveillance/>

¹⁸ Discrimination Act, 2008:567

Available: <https://www.do.se/choose-language/english/discrimination-act-2008567>

all regardless of gender. This includes investigating the existence of any risks of discrimination, as well as taking prevention and promotion measures. Notably, employers are obliged:

- to promote gender balance in different types of work, among different categories of employees and in management positions by means of education and training, skills development and other appropriate measures
- to have guidelines and routines for their activities to prevent harassment, sexual harassment and reprisals
- to assess whether pay differences are directly or indirectly associated with gender.

Furthermore, **the Equality Ombudsman** is to supervise compliance with this Act. The Ombudsman first tries to persuade those affected by the law to follow it willingly. However, the equality ombudsman may also bring a court action on behalf of the individual who consents to it.

Sweden has an authority responsible for protecting individual's privacy in the information society without unnecessarily preventing or complicating the use of new technology. Sweden is one of the few countries where national helplines for women meet the Council of Europe standards. The state-run helpline service, Kvinnofridslinjen, also runs a website. The website primarily supports women survivors of violence and their families but also assists professionals working in the field. In addition to the two national women's helplines, most of the crisis **centers** and women's shelters in Sweden run helplines and online chats that women all over Sweden can access. In total, more than 100 helplines are run by crisis centers and women's shelters.

In 2017, Sweden initiated a comprehensive 10-year national strategy aimed at preventing and combating men's violence against women. The plan is broken down into four guiding targets: more and effective preventive work against violence; better detection and stronger protection for women and children who are victims of crime; more effective law enforcement; and improved knowledge and working methods. The strategy's main focus, departing from an intersectional perspective, is on the perpetrator rather than the victim, on girls' and young women's exposure to crime and on improved cooperation and knowledge-based working methods.

5.4. Denmark Legislative Framework

Denmark, renowned for its commitment to human rights and social equality, has established a robust legal framework to address various forms of violence and discrimination, including those related to sex, gender, and other personal characteristics. Within this framework are laws and regulations designed to tackle targeted forms of TFGBV, ensure data protection in compliance with the GDPR, and uphold the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment.

According to the **Danish Criminal Code**¹⁹:

- **SECTION 217|** Prohibits any person from inducing another individual to engage in sexual intercourse through illegal coercion. Importantly, the law specifies that coercion does not necessarily involve physical violence or the explicit threat of violence. This means that psychological coercion, which can be exerted through technology, such as cyberbullying, harassment, or the dissemination of intimate images without consent could also be

¹⁹ <https://antislaverylaw.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Denmark-Criminal-Code.pdf>

considered illegal coercion under this provision. The punishment for this offense is imprisonment for up to four years. This highlights the seriousness with which Danish law treats acts of coercion aimed at procuring sexual intercourse, regardless of the means used, including those facilitated by technology.

- **SECTION 232|** States that any person who violates decency or provides public outrage by indecent conditions, is punishable by fine or imprisonment up to four years. This provision can be applicable to cases pertaining to sharing the content of a sexual or pornographic nature, or sending sexual images or videos to someone who has not consented to receiving the material, also known as “digital flashing”. The penalty is two years if the victim is over 15 years old, and four years if the victim is under 15 years old.
- **SECTION 260|** Addresses unlawful coercion. As per this section, unlawful coercion involves forcing someone to do, tolerate, or refrain from doing something through various means, including: Violence or threat of violence, threat of major damage to property, detention, making false criminal accusations or accusations of shameful conduct, revealing private or intimate matters. The provision recognizes that coercion can occur through threats related to criminal offenses or defamation. This encompasses situations where perpetrators use technology to threaten to disclose sensitive or damaging information, including false accusations or defamation online, to force someone into certain actions or behaviours.
- **SECTION 263|** Prohibits individuals from using a device to secretly intercept or record statements made in private conversations. This provision also criminalizes the unlawful access to someone else's information or programs intended for use in an information system. This addresses situations where individuals gain unauthorized access to personal data, private communications, or computer programs through hacking, phishing, or other illegal means.
- **SECTION 264(D)|** States that if images or videos of sexual content are shared without the consent of the person appearing on the material, the sharing can be punished with up to six months' imprisonment if the person in the picture or video is over 18 years of age. In especially severe cases, the penalty can be increased to up to three years in prison. This may be the case, for example, if the material is shared to a particularly large extent.
- **SECTION 276|** The law prohibits individuals from threatening someone with violence, significant damage to property, detention, false accusations of criminal offenses, accusations of shameful conduct, or revealing private matters in order to obtain unlawful gain or benefit.

In situations where pornographic content depicts individuals under 18 years of age, it falls under the category of child pornography, and the penalty is two years' imprisonment and, in particularly aggravating circumstances, up to six years' imprisonment. A majority in the Danish Parliament wants to criminalise stalking with an independent provision in the Penal Code. Today, stalking is banned in the sense that the police can issue a restraining order for the stalker. This means that it is forbidden for the person to continue stalking, as doing so would violate the condition. The penalty is two years in prison. However, experiences have shown that restraint is not effective enough to stop or prevent stalking. An independent provision in the penal code will make it possible to react more quickly and will send a clear signal that stalking is a serious issue.

Besides the GDPR, Denmark has implemented its own supplementary regulation, the Danish Data Protection Act²⁰, which sets out specific rules and provisions regarding the processing of personal data within Denmark, ensuring compliance with the GDPR while also addressing certain national requirements or specifics. Denmark has also ratified and implemented the Istanbul Convention in 2014.

5.5. Netherlands Legislative Framework

The Dutch Criminal Code²¹ contains provisions that address various forms of gender-based and technology-facilitated violence. Specific offences are typically categorized under broader legal concepts such as assault, sexual offenses, harassment, and human trafficking. Some key provisions in the Dutch Criminal Code that pertain to gender-based or technology-facilitated violence are found in:

- **SECTION 138(A, B)** | If someone intentionally and unlawfully accesses a computer system, they are guilty of computer trespass. If the offender subsequently copies data from the accessed system for their use or someone else's, they could face up to four years in prison or a significant fine.
- **SECTION 139(A-E)** | Any person, who by means of a technical device, intentionally eavesdrops or records a conversation without being a participant in it or without consent is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months or a fine; Anyone who intentionally intercepts or records data being transmitted through telecommunications can be punished with up to one year in prison or a fine; If someone installs a device intending to eavesdrop on, or record conversations, or any other form of data exchange using computer systems, could face up to one year of imprisonment or a significant fine.
- **SECTION 139(F, G)** | Punishes the intentional and unlawful production of private images and prohibits public sharing of such images.
- **SECTIONS 284** | Covers the offense of extortion; any person who compels another person to act or to refrain from certain acts by threat shall be liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding nine months or a fine.
- **SECTION 285(B)** | Covers offenses related to coercive privacy violation; any person who unlawfully violates another person's personal privacy with the intention of compelling that other person to act or refrain from certain acts is guilty of stalking and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.
- **SECTIONS 300-304** | Covers offenses related to assault, including physical violence or harm inflicted on another person. This includes domestic violence, which may be prosecuted under these provisions if committed within the context of a domestic relationship.

²⁰ The Data Protection Act, 23 May 2018, <https://www.datatilsynet.dk/media/7753/danish-data-protection-act.pdf>

²¹ Criminal Code of Netherlands, 3 March 1881

Available: <https://antislaverylaw.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Netherlands-Criminal-Code.pdf>

Regarding image-based abuse, the Netherlands, like the USA, does not have specific, nation-wide legislation. Instead, it relies on existing laws related to privacy violation and defamation, such as the EU's GDPR, which provides a comprehensive framework for the protection of personal data. Therefore, penalties vary depending on how courts interpret these laws. The Netherlands also has **the Equal Treatment Law**, which protects all citizens and persons within the Kingdom of the Netherlands from unequal treatment and discrimination.²² The principle of equality in the Netherlands was not protected by special civil anti-discrimination law until 1994. Before then, special civil law only protected discrimination on the grounds of sex. The equal treatment act, on the other hand, is designed to prevent discrimination based on various characteristics, including age, in the workplace and in access to goods and services. It applies to both the public and private sectors and covers areas such as employment, education, housing, and public accommodations.

The Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and other protected characteristics, such as race, sex, sexual orientation, religion or belief, disability, and marital status. Under the act, discriminatory practices such as unfair dismissal, unequal pay, or denial of access to services based on age are prohibited. Individuals who believe they have experienced discrimination can file complaints with the Netherlands Institute for Human Rights, which is responsible for investigating and addressing cases of discrimination. The provisions included in the act can intersect with TFGBV in several ways:

- **EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION**| The Equal Treatment Act prohibits discrimination based on gender and other protected characteristics in employment. Employers are obligated to provide a safe working environment free from harassment and discrimination, including harassment facilitated by technology.
- **ACCESS TO SERVICES**| the act ensures that individuals have equal access to services without facing discrimination or harassment based on their gender identity and expression.
- **EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS**| the equal treatment act also applies to educational institutions, ensuring that students are not subjected to discrimination or harassment based on their gender. this includes addressing instances of TFGBV that may occur within educational settings, such as online bullying or harassment.

Additionally, **Netherlands' Civil Society priorities**²³ includes online and technology-facilitated sexual and gender-based violence and discrimination. The document states that, when women and girls are online, they are more likely than men to experience sexual and gender-based digital violence. Moreover, online harassment is related to harassment in the real world. Therefore, it is increasingly important to develop policies, systems, and tools to detect risk factors and underlying causes of TFGBV, improve and enforce laws and regulations on online and technology-facilitated gender-based violence, and protect groups that are at particular risk, e.g., female activists, politicians, defenders of gender equality and LGBTQI+ rights.

²² <https://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0006502/2020-01-01>

²³ The Netherlands' Civil Society Priorities for the Agreed Conclusions 67th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, 6-17 March 2023

<https://prod-cdn.atria.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2023/02/01150024/CSW67-Priorities-civil-society-English-version.pdf>

5.6. Key Differences and Similarities

Terms like image-based abuse, online impersonation, cyberstalking, cyberbullying, and online harassment can oftentimes overlap. That's why it's important to clearly define the categories and types of technology-facilitated gender-based abuse when comparing the legislation of different countries. For instance, online harassment may encompass cyberstalking and cyberbullying, while online impersonation may involve the use of shallowfake or deepfake technologies. However, as TFGBV can manifest itself in various forms, gaining a clear understanding of each country's legal framework requires defining several key categories of TFGBV and comparing the laws, regulations, and legislation in these countries regarding the principal forms of technology-based harassment.

These are the primary forms of violence directly tied to acts committed or amplified using digital tools or technologies, causing multiple forms of harm to women and girls worldwide.

ONLINE HARASSMENT is one of the most pervasive issues that affects individuals worldwide, particularly women and girls. All five countries have comprehensive legislation addressing online harassment. Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, and Denmark all contain provisions on using devices to secretly intercept or record statements made in private conversations. In case of the European countries, the aforementioned violation is subject to a maximum of two years' prison sentence. In case of Canada, intercepting private communications is punishable by up to five years' imprisonment. Canada's Criminal Code contains a separate section prohibiting harassment that causes a person to fear for their safety, including repeatedly communicating with someone or others known to them. The wording of the Canadian Criminal Code doesn't specify a form of communication; therefore, the unwanted communication is not limited to communicating offline. This idea is further strengthened by the Privacy Act, which states that any violation of privacy is considered a tort and is actionable without proof of damage. In this regard, Dutch and Canadian approaches to violation of privacy and stalking are quite similar. However, law in the Netherlands takes things one step further, and states that any person who violates another person's personal privacy with the intention of compelling that other person to act or refrain from certain acts is guilty of stalking and is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine.

Dutch legislation is not limited to acts where one fears for one's safety, but also includes situations where someone is forced to act, refrain from acting, or tolerate something. This differs from American laws, which often focus on harassment or fear for safety. The legislation in the Netherlands, however, extends to cases where individuals are compelled to do, not do, or tolerate something. The Dutch approach emphasizes the protection of privacy, grounded in constitutional and human rights provisions. This approach clarifies the offense by avoiding vague terms like "harassment" and aligns with broader principles of respect for privacy and personal autonomy. A similar approach is seen in Sweden, where physical and online stalking are not differentiated.

IMAGE-BASED ABUSE commonly known as nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos, involves the distribution or sharing of intimate images or videos without the consent of the individual depicted, often with the intent to harm or embarrass them. Canada and the USA have both enacted laws specifically targeting nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos. In Canada, Section 162 of the Criminal Code prohibits the distribution or

advertising of intimate images without consent, punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Additionally, the "Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act" enhances protections against online crime, including provisions for removing intimate images from the internet and restrictions on offenders' computer and internet use.

In the USA, 48 states and the District of Columbia have laws against nonconsensual distribution of intimate images, criminalizing the act of knowingly distributing private, sexually explicit images without consent. However, the legal framework varies by state, with some states classifying nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos as a misdemeanor and others as a felony offense. Unlike Canada, the USA lacks federal legislation specifically targeting nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos. Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark also criminalize the production and sharing of private images without consent, which demonstrates a commitment to protecting individuals from image-based abuse.

Denmark, Sweden, and Canada are countries that share the most similarities in their approach and enforcement mechanisms: all three have nation-wide laws addressing nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos, which provides more consistency and clarity around this issue. The penalties for violating these laws generally include fines and imprisonment, with variations in severity. The USA has state-level legislation, which results in variations in laws and penalties across different state jurisdictions. The Netherlands, too, does not have specific legislation targeting nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos, and mainly relies on court interpretation.

ONLINE IMPERSONATION the act of falsely representing oneself as another person on the internet, is a growing concern globally. In Canada, Section 403 of the Criminal Code prohibits the fraudulent personation of another person, punishable by imprisonment for up to 10 years. The "Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act" sets further protections against online crime, including computer and internet use. The USA also has various laws addressing online impersonation, like the CFAA and Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, that apply to cases involving hacking or unauthorized use of accounts. In contrast, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, online impersonation is addressed under the broader context of fraudulent activities.

Coercive behaviour, particularly sexual extortion or sextortion involves using threats or intimidation to compel someone into sexual acts or other actions against their will. All countries have comprehensive legal frameworks that cover this offense. In particular, in the U.S, laws against sextortion primarily fall under the state jurisdiction. As of today, 17 states and Washington D.C., have laws banning sexual extortion.²⁴ State-specific statutes typically criminalize actions such as threatening to distribute intimate images or videos unless the victim complies with the perpetrator's demands. The exact penalties vary by state but commonly include provisions for imprisonment, fines, and registration as a sex offender for convicted individuals. Sextortion may be prosecuted under various criminal statutes, depending on the specific circumstances of the case. Common charges include extortion, blackmail, harassment, stalking, and invasion of privacy. Prosecutors may also pursue charges related to computer crimes if the sextortion involved hacking into

²⁴ <https://cybercivilrights.org/sextortion-laws/>

electronic devices or accessing private accounts without authorization. While sextortion is primarily addressed at the state level in the U.S, there are federal statutes that may apply in certain cases. While Canada focuses on criminalizing coercion through threats, the USA relies on state laws that criminalize threatening to distribute intimate images.

Denmark's legal framework prohibits inducing another individual to engage in sexual intercourse through illegal coercion under Section 217 of the criminal code. This provision recognizes that coercion does not necessarily involve physical violence and can encompass psychological coercion facilitated by technology. Additionally, Section 260 addresses unlawful coercion through various means, including threats related to defamation or false accusations made online. Danish law treats acts of coercion aimed at procuring sexual intercourse seriously, regardless of the means used, with imprisonment as a penalty. Dutch law, on the other hand does not specifically target extortion, however, Section 284 of the criminal code can be applied to cases involving coercion for sexual purposes. As for Sweden, Sweden's legal framework addresses unlawful coercion under Section 4 of the criminal code, which prohibits coercion through violence, threat of violence, or threat of a criminal act.

ISTANBUL CONVENTION| The Istanbul Convention is the most far-reaching international treaty to tackle serious violations of human rights, such as sexual violence, cyberviolence, domestic violence, etc. The Netherlands signed the Convention in November 2012 and ratified it by November 2015, with the treaty coming into force in March 2016. Sweden, an early supporter, signed the Convention in May 2011 and ratified it in July 2014, leading to its enforcement in November 2014. Denmark joined in October 2013 and ratified it by April 2014, with the Convention taking effect in August 2014.

Although both the USA and Canada have not signed the Convention, they have national regulations to address violence against women, which are discussed above in the report.

6. Analysis of the Legal Framework of Armenia

6.1. Overview

Currently, there are no specific legislative provisions on TFGBV within Armenian law. Armenia's current legal statutes largely reflect traditional forms of criminal behaviour and interpersonal violence, focusing on direct physical or verbal abuse that can be clearly defined and observed without the nuances introduced by technology. Laws that address harassment, stalking, and protection from abuse often do not explicitly extend into the digital realm where TFGBV occurs. The rapid evolution of technology and digital communication outpaces the slower legislative processes. As new forms of abuse emerge through digital platforms, **existing laws become outdated and insufficient to cover specific acts of TFGBV** such as online harassment, cyberstalking, and the non-consensual distribution of intimate images. On the other hand, the lack of awareness or recognition among lawmakers and the public about the severity and specific nature of TFGBV makes it challenging to push for the development and enactment of specific laws.

Yet, **the absence of specific legislation on TFGBV or relevant provisions in existing legislation leave significant gaps in protection for victims**, which justifies the urgent need for legal reform. Specific TFGBV laws would help establish clear legal prohibitions against such acts, offering direct routes for prevention, enforcement, and redress. This would not only protect victims but also serve as a deterrent against potential perpetrators. In this regard, specific statutes can provide a framework for supporting victims, including mechanisms for reporting incidents, obtaining restraining orders, and claiming damages. Specific laws can offer precise definitions and protocols that aid in the investigation and prosecution of digital abuse cases, reducing ambiguity that may hinder the enforcement of more general laws.

To address the current lack of specific legislative provisions on TFGBV in Armenia and to achieve a safer digital environment for women, relevant legislative initiatives or reforms need to be introduced. These initiatives should be informed by global best practices, which are discussed earlier in the report and are presented below.

6.2. Incorporating TFGBV into the Criminal Code of Armenia

Armenia's Criminal Code²⁵ has provisions that deal with violence, but these are mostly oriented towards physical assaults or direct threats. **Cyber-related offenses are not explicitly detailed**, which creates a legal vacuum for TFGBV, where much of the abuse might not necessarily be direct or physical. For instance, current laws might **not clearly address scenarios like cyberstalking, non-consensual sharing of intimate images, or digital impersonation, unless they can be directly linked to tangible threats or harassment**.

For example, **Article 162 of Chapter 27 of the Criminal Code of Armenia**, refers to making a person commit suicide or attempted suicide by means of threats, cruel treatment or humiliating.

²⁵ Criminal Code of RA, 05.05.2021

Available: arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?DocID=153080

While cyberbullying, online harassment, as well as the non-consensual distribution and threat of distribution of intimate images/videos, contain the risk of self-harm by the victim, **they are not reflected in the criminal code anyhow.**

Similarly, the psychological pressure, which includes the **threat of committing a crime against sexual freedom** or integrity of a person, if there was a real risk of carrying out the threat, as well as social isolation or regular humiliation of the honor of a person is criminalized under **Article 194 of Chapter 26** of the Criminal Code. However, the **term “real threat” diminishes the possibility of legal protection of victims of crimes committed in the virtual environment**, such as cyberstalking, and the threat of distribution of one’s intimate images.

In this regard, **the best practice of the Danish Criminal Code can be applied**, where **Section 217 prohibits** any person from inducing another individual to engage in sexual intercourse through illegal coercion, specifying that coercion **does not necessarily involve** physical violence or the **explicit threat of violence**. In this regard, psychological coercion, which can be exerted through technology, such as cyberbullying, harassment, or the dissemination of intimate images without consent **could also be considered illegal coercion** under this provision. The punishment for this offense is imprisonment for up to four years. In Canada, Section 346 of the Criminal Code deals with exerting pressure on another person through threats, typically to coerce them into taking a certain action. It specifies that this offense can result in imprisonment for up to five years.

This highlights the seriousness with which Danish and Canadian laws treat acts of threats, distribution of non-consensual intimate images as well as coercion aimed at procuring sexual intercourse, regardless of the means used, including those facilitated by technology, whereas the punishment for the **threat of committing a crime against sexual freedom under Article 194 of Armenian Criminal Code** stipulates financial fine, or imprisonment from one month to one year. Moreover, **Article 198 of Armenian Criminal Code**, which refers to the forced actions of sexual nature, **does not contain a legal basis for punishment** of technology-facilitated sexual crimes.

This necessity of the precision and specificity of legislative provisions **within criminal law** stems from the fundamental principle that **it does not permit analogical interpretation**. Unlike other branches of law where broader interpretations may apply, **criminal law mandates explicit clarity in its statutes to ensure its fair application**. Consequently, sanctions delineated under the Criminal Code are enforceable solely when there exists a concrete legal foundation articulated through specific provisions within the relevant chapters.

This requirement for specificity is crucial because the **stakes in criminal law**, typically involving penalties such as imprisonment or substantial fines, **are significantly higher compared to other legal domains**. The absence of explicit provisions can lead to significant gaps in legal protection and enforcement in the contexts of TFGBV, where the rapid evolution of technology continually spawns new modalities of criminal behavior.

Therefore, there is a need for making amendments in mentioned provisions of Armenian Criminal Code or introduce new specific clauses that define and criminalize various forms of TFGBV such as cyberstalking and online harassment, **similar to Canada’s Criminal Code Section 264**, which

should include provisions against repeated and unwanted communication, threats, and behaviors that cause fear for personal safety.

When it comes to the image-based abuse, while Armenia's current legal provisions **under Articles 204 and 300 of the RA Criminal Code** ostensibly address aspects of privacy and distribution of pornographic materials, there remain substantial gaps that necessitate specific legislation on nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos. More specifically, **Articles 204 and 300**, while relevant, **do not specifically address the complexities associated with nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos. Article 204 focuses on the broader context** of use and dissemination of data pertaining to personal or family life without explicitly mentioning intimate images. **Article 300 criminalizes the distribution of pornographic materials through the use of information technologies but does not distinguish between consensually shared and non-consensually distributed materials** in the context of privacy violations. At the same time, the nonconsensual distribution of intimate images/videos **involves a breach of trust** where intimate images shared within the context of a private relationship are distributed without consent. This specific **violation of privacy and trust is distinct from general privacy breaches** or the distribution of pornographic content and **requires clear legal definitions and provisions that directly address the consent aspect linked to intimate images.**

The Criminal Code of **Canada**²⁶ prohibits knowingly distributing or advertising intimate images without consent, punishable by imprisonment for up to five years (Section 162), as well as outlines the legal consequences for individuals who knowingly intercept private communications using any electronic, acoustic, mechanical, or similar device, punishable by up to five years' imprisonment (Section 184). Similarly, **Section 139 (F,G) of the Dutch Criminal Code**²⁷ prohibits and punishes the intentional and unlawful production and public sharing of private images. Therefore, similar to **Canada's and Netherlands' Criminal Codes**, respective provisions should be introduced in the local Criminal Code, where penalties may include imprisonment and fines, with additional stipulations for repeat offenders or particularly malicious cases.

Similarly, legal bases are needed in the Criminal Code to combat **digital impersonation**, which involves **using someone else's identity online without their consent** (often to defraud, deceive, harass, or tarnish their reputation). This can range from creating fake social media accounts to impersonating someone on forums or via email to commit malicious acts. The ease of creating accounts and communicating online makes digital impersonation a particularly insidious form of abuse. Perpetrators can quickly assume others' identities and cause significant harm before the victim is even aware. In order to combat identity theft and fake profiles, there is a need for introducing provision similar to **Section 403 of Canada's Criminal Code**, explicitly outlawing digital impersonation used to defraud or harm another individual. Incorporating digital impersonation into Armenia's Criminal Code involves creating specific legal provisions that

²⁶ Criminal Code R.S.C., 1985

Available: <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-46/index.html>

²⁷ Dutch Criminal Code, March 1881

<https://antislaverylaw.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/Netherlands-Criminal-Code.pdf>

address the nuances of this offense within the digital context. In this regard, there is a need for introducing a specific section within the Criminal Code that makes it an offense to impersonate someone digitally. This provision should include penalties that reflect the severity of the offense, such as fines, imprisonment, or both. The law should specify higher penalties if the digital impersonation leads to significant harm to the victim, such as financial loss, damage to reputation, or emotional distress. Updating the law will also give law enforcement agencies the necessary powers and tools to investigate digital impersonation, which might include the ability to work with internet service providers and social media platforms to trace the origin of fraudulent activities.

The analysis of international best practices reveals that addressing TFGBV most effectively involves incorporating specific provisions within the Criminal Code. This approach is commonly adopted across various jurisdictions to ensure that the legal framework is adequately equipped to handle the complexities associated with digital forms of gender-based violence. By embedding TFGBV within the Criminal Code, it allows for a unified approach to prosecution and sentencing, ensuring consistency across different cases and jurisdictions. This consistency is crucial for both deterring potential offenders and providing justice to victims. It will help clearly define these acts as crimes, which is vital for law enforcement, legal practitioners, and the public. Clear statutory language helps eliminate ambiguities about what constitutes TFGBV, aiding in more effective enforcement and better awareness amongst potential victims about their rights. Criminal codes typically provide for more stringent penalties than civil or administrative legal frameworks, which will serve as a strong deterrent against committing acts of TFGBV. This is especially important given the invasive and often hidden nature of these crimes. Additionally, criminal proceedings offer structured support systems for victims, such as restraining orders, anonymity protections, and potential state-sponsored support services, which are essential for protecting the victim's safety and privacy, often compromised in cases of TFGBV.

6.3. Incorporating TFGBV into Armenia's Law on Data Privacy Protection

Deciding whether TFGBV should be regulated through Criminal Code or Personal Data Protection Law involves considering the nature of the offense, the intended outcomes of the legislation, and the broader implications for enforcement and victim protection. Though both approaches have merits and can be complementary, **each serves fundamentally different legal approaches, functions and focuses** with distinct implications for enforcement, victim protection, and prevention. The Criminal Code, by addressing TFGBV, would primarily view and treat these actions as criminal offenses. As discussed above, this incorporation would entail defining specific behaviors such as cyberstalking, non-consensual sharing of intimate images, and digital impersonation as crimes, subject to penalties including fines and imprisonment. This approach emphasizes deterrence, punitive measures, and providing justice for victims through criminal prosecution, highlighting the severity and social unacceptability of such acts.

Conversely, integrating TFGBV into the Personal Data Protection Law would focus more on the privacy and data security aspects of the abuse. It would regulate **how personal data is used and shared**, aiming to prevent misuse that facilitates gender-based violence. This method would involve setting standards for data handling, granting victims rights to control their personal information, and possibly requiring entities (organizations, institutions, or companies that handle

personal data) to implement protective measures to prevent data misuse. While this approach also provides mechanisms for victim protection, it does so through the lens of data rights and privacy, potentially offering remedies such as **data deletion or corrections, and might involve less severe penalties than those imposed under criminal law.** Although **Armenia's Law on Protection of Data Privacy**²⁸ primarily focuses on the handling of personal data by various bodies and the conditions under which such data may be processed, the principles and protections it outlines are critical in the context of TFGBV. It is not specifically tailored to address TFGBV, however provides a foundational framework that can be leveraged to protect victims of such violence.

First, the personal data protection law of Armenia ensures that personal data cannot be used without the explicit consent of the individual (see **Article 4.2**). Moreover, Article 12 regulates the specifications of processing the data of so called **“Special Category”, which includes information referring to person’s sexual life.** Although **Article 12.1** clearly prohibits processing personal data of special category, this principle is directly violated in cases of TFGBV, where personal data is used without permission, and for harmful purposes. The law also mandates that entities processing personal data must take adequate measures to protect data from unauthorized access and misuse. This provision can be extended to prevent TFGBV, requiring entities to implement security measures that protect individuals from digital harassment or abuse. Moreover, the law usually grants individuals the right to access, rectify, and delete their personal data. This enables those affected by TFGBV to regain control of their data and lessen the impact of the abuse, such as demanding the removal of non-consensually shared images. However, it's important to note that while victims can request the deletion of such images, complete control over the distribution of the images may be difficult to achieve if the perpetrator has already shared them widely. While the existing Personal Data Protection Law provides some level of protection, specific enhancements or additions could make it more effective in addressing TFGBV. Namely, there is a need for amending the law to explicitly include provisions against using personal data for harassing, stalking, or other forms of online abuse. Moreover, **stricter control by the authorized bodies must be introduced over the misuse of highly sensitive data,** such as intimate images or communications, which are often exploited in TFGBV.

Moreover, in order to strengthen its personal data protection mechanisms on a State level, **Armenia may follow the European legislative framework of data protection.** Since 25 May 2018, the principal data protection legislation in the EU has been Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (the “General Data Protection Regulation” or “GDPR”). In **Sweden**, the Data Protection Act and the Data Protection Regulation supplement the GDPR. There are also several sector-specific legislations which impact data protection, for example, the Criminal Data Act and the Camera Surveillance Act. Processing of personal data is lawful only if, and to the extent that, it is permitted **under EU data protection law.** Similarly, **Denmark**, has implemented its own supplementary regulation, the Danish Data Protection Act. It sets out specific rules and provisions regarding the

²⁸ Personal Data Protection Law of RA, 18.05.2015

<https://www.legalis.am/Document/View.aspx?DocID=98338>

processing of personal data within Denmark, ensuring compliance with the GDPR while also addressing certain national requirements or specifics.

6.4. Incorporating TFGBV into the Law on the Prevention of Family and Domestic Violence, Protection of Persons Subjected to Family and Domestic Violence

TFGBV is also relevant to Armenia's law on the "Prevention of Family and Domestic Violence, Protection of Persons Subjected to Family and Domestic Violence"²⁹, given the significance of the increasingly digital nature of interpersonal relationships and the potential for technology to be used as a tool for abuse within domestic settings. Domestic violence traditionally encompasses physical, emotional, sexual, and psychological abuse. TFGBV extends these categories into the digital realm, where abusive behaviors can include cyberstalking, online harassment, and the non-consensual distribution of intimate images. Recognizing these behaviors as forms of domestic violence is crucial for comprehensive protection. On the other hand, the law provides mechanisms of protection orders to prevent further abuse. Extending these orders to include prohibitions against digital communications and the use of technology to harass or track victims can be an effective way to prevent TFGBV.

Incorporating TFGBV into this framework will also ensure that victims have legal recourse not only for physical or in-person abuse but also for abuse perpetrated online. This can be particularly important for actions like using technology to isolate, monitor, or control a partner, which may not leave physical traces but have severe emotional and psychological impacts. Addressing TFGBV within this context means providing specialized counseling for perpetrators and victims, focusing on the dynamics of digital abuse and ways to establish healthy boundaries online. Namely, **Article 5** of the law typically outlines the protective measures that can be employed to safeguard victims, such as restraining orders or mandatory counseling for perpetrators. There is a need for amending this provision to explicitly include prohibitions against digital forms of harassment and abuse. For instance, restraining orders could be extended to prevent perpetrators from using digital platforms to contact, track, or harass victims. Specific language could be added to cover the use of GPS tracking, social media, or other online communication tools in the context of domestic violence.

Article 15, which outlines the responsibilities and authority of the police in responding to reports of family and domestic violence, can be expanded in a way to include specific protocols for handling digital abuse cases, such as training police officers to recognize and collect evidence of online harassment, cyberstalking, or the unauthorized sharing of intimate images. **The police should also have an expanded authority authority to collaborate with tech companies to quickly secure or retrieve digital evidence.** By specifically enhancing these articles within Armenia's domestic violence legislation to address the nuances of TFGBV, the law

²⁹ Prevention of Family and Domestic Violence, Protection of Persons Subjected to Family and Domestic Violence, 12.04.2024

<https://www.arlis.am/DocumentView.aspx?docid=192526>

can provide a more robust framework for protecting victims and preventing abuse in the digital age. These amendments would not only extend protections to cover the evolving landscape of domestic violence but also ensure that both law enforcement and judicial systems are equipped to handle these complex cases effectively. Such targeted legal reforms underscore a commitment to adapting to technological advancements while safeguarding individual rights within a modern context.

6.5. Incorporating TFGBV into the Law on “The Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities between Women and Men” of Armenia

TFGBV is not just a personal security issue but a significant barrier to achieving gender equality, as recognized by the **Armenian Law on Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities between Women and Men**³⁰. In this regard, enhancing the law to specifically address TFGBV would affirm Armenia’s commitment to gender equality in all spheres, including the digital domain, which will ensure that women and girls can participate safely and freely online without the fear of gender-based violence.

The relevance of TFGBV with the respective law is evident as TFGBV often targets women and girls, undermining their rights to privacy, security, and freedom of expression online. This form of violence can discourage women’s active participation in digital spaces, impacting their educational, social, and professional opportunities. Yet it is not formally recognized as a form of GBV in Armenia’s relevant legislation. Therefore, the law could be enhanced by explicitly mentioning TFGBV as a form of gender-based violence that undermines gender equality, and recognizing the unique challenges of digital environments and the specific impacts on women and girls. **Namely, Article 6** prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender including gender wage discrimination, discrimination based on marital status, sexual harassment, etc. **The definition of discrimination in this article should be expanded to include TFGBV, making it clear that digital abuse based on gender is a form of discrimination and thereby illegal.** This expansion should also guide the creation of policies within workplaces, educational institutions, and other areas to specifically address and prevent digital harassment and abuse.

The approach of considering TFGBV as a form of gender-based violence is well reflected in **Sweden**, which has a strong legal framework for gender equality and combatting violence against women and can serve as a best practice for Armenia in terms of addressing TFGBV in relevant legislation. **The Discrimination Act addresses the discrimination in the form of inadequate accessibility, which means that employers are obligated to prevent and address harassment and discrimination experienced by employees, including online harassment or cyberbullying based on gender.** Similarly, according to the **Dutch Equal Treatment Act, employers are obligated to provide a safe working environment free from harassment and discrimination, including harassment facilitated by technology. Educational institutions, on their turn, have the obligation of ensuring that students are not subjected to discrimination or**

³⁰ Armenian Law on Equal Rights and Equal Opportunities between Women and Men, 20.05.2013

arlis.am/documentView.aspx?docID=83841

harassment based on their gender, which includes **addressing instances of TFGBV that may occur within educational settings, such as online bullying or harassment.**

Quantitative and Qualitative Research Results

7. Survey Results

An online survey was conducted targeting girls and women, including women entrepreneurs in Armenia. The quantitative data was collected through the online survey, which was distributed to participants through the Safe YOU mobile application and other digital channels. A total of 642 responses were collected. The responses were systematically filtered to exclude irrelevant data. Initially, 49 male respondents were excluded, as the survey was specifically designed for female participants.

Subsequently, responses were filtered based on age, with the survey targeting individuals aged 18 to 65. Although TFGBV can also affect individuals under 18, ethical guidelines for conducting research on gender-based violence and discrimination preclude the inclusion of this age group. Consequently, the survey questions were not accessible to individuals outside the specified age range.

An additional filter was applied based on the frequency of internet usage. Although all respondents who were not business owners indicated using the internet several times a week or more, highlighting a high level of internet accessibility among participants, only 23 respondents reported using social media platforms once a month or less. Similarly, among women who were business owners, only 5 reported using the internet once a month or less.

In addition to the forms detailed in Chapter 1, TFGBV involves restricting or controlling access to technology³¹. This aspect could have been explored through responses from individuals who reported limited use of the internet and social media platforms. However, it is critical to investigate the underlying reasons for limited internet usage in such cases. Potential reasons include:

- affordability (limited access to internet packages or suitable devices, financial strains to maintain access),
- access (inadequate internet connection at home or elsewhere)
- ability (lack of digital skills, confidence to navigate the online environment safely and knowledgeably, or barriers related to disability)³²
- availability (digital or physical control over access to devices or accounts and inspection of devices by family members, partners, or others).

However, measuring this type of TFGBV requires more data and separate research. Consequently, the survey focused only on the TFGBV forms detailed in the first chapter of the report.

After the removal of all non-relevant responses and the cleaning of the survey database, **400 valid responses** remained for the analysis, which will be addressed in the following chapters.

³¹ A review of Ofcom's research on digital exclusion among adults in the UK, Ofcom, 30 March 2022, available: <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/siteassets/resources/documents/research-and-data/media-literacy-research/adults/adults-media-use-and-attitudes-2022/digital-exclusion-review-2022.pdf>

³² <https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld5803/ldselect/ldcomm/219/21905.htm>

7.1. Demographic and Screening Analysis

Marz and Community Type of Residence

This section provides a breakdown of respondents by marzes and an analysis of regional differences in their responses. The survey gathered data from 400 respondents (n=400) across Yerevan and marzes.

Figure 8.1.1. Marz of residence (N=400)





Figure 8.1.2. Residence community type (N=400)




Yerevan has the highest number of respondents, making up nearly half of the total survey population (49%, n=196), reflecting its status as the capital and most populous city of Armenia. In contrast, there are no respondents from Vayots Dzor, and Syunik and Tavush have the fewest respondents, each with 2.5% (n=10) of the total.

Most respondents reside in urban areas (78%, n=312), while a smaller proportion live in rural areas (21%, n=83). The remaining respondents (1%, n=5) did not specify their community type. This distribution highlights a notable urban-rural disparity in respondent distribution, underscoring the predominance of urban respondents in the survey.

Age Distribution

Figure 8.1.3. Age Distribution (N=400)




The survey indicates a diverse age representation among respondents, with the majority falling into the 19-24 age group (56.0%, n=224). The next significant cohort is the 25-34 age group, representing 28% (n=111) of respondents. Together, these two age groups constitute over 80% of the survey participants, highlighting a strong presence of younger adults in the survey samples and suggesting potential trends or preferences that may align with younger demographics.

a strong presence of younger adults in the survey samples and suggesting potential trends or preferences that may align with younger demographics.

Household Income and Size

The survey reveals a varied distribution of household incomes among respondents, with the majority falling within the income ranges of 100,000-249,999 AMD (n=99) and 250,000-499,999 AMD (n=103). Together, these two brackets constitute over 50% of the total respondents.

Figure 8.1.4. Household income (N=400)




Another notable portion of respondents include respondents who did not provide their household bracket, accounting for 88 of combined responses from “Difficult to answer” and “Refuse to answer” categories. This could indicate some level of sensitivity or hesitation in disclosing income details.

1,000,000-2,499,999 AMD bracket (n=21) and the 500,000-999,999 AMD bracket (n=60).

This distribution highlights a broad spectrum of economic backgrounds represented among survey participants, providing a comprehensive foundation for exploring correlations between income levels and survey responses.


Figure 8.1.5. Household size (N=400)



Most respondents (42%) live in households with 3-4 people, followed by 22.5% who live in households with 5-6 people.

Education


Figure 8.1.6 Education level (N=400)



The largest groups among survey participants include those with higher or postgraduate education, comprising 62.8% (n=251) of the total respondents, and individuals with middle vocational education, accounting for 18.3% (n=73).

Marital Status


Figure 8.1.7. Marital status (N=400)



The survey data reveals that the majority are either single (60.5%) or married/in a domestic partnership (35.5%). These two groups represent over 96% of the total respondents.


Employment status

Figure 8.1.8. Employment status (N=400)



65% (n=260) are employed, with the largest segment, 38.5% (n=153) being full-time employees. Part-time employees and the self-employed constitute 13.5% (n=54) and 13.5% (n=53) of the sample, respectively. Among the unemployed, 17.5% (n=69) are students, 10% (n=40) are currently seeking job opportunities, and 5.5% (n=22) are not working by choice, such as homemakers.

Figure 8.1.9. Occupation categories (N=260)




The majority of respondents identified as field specialists or experts, comprising 31.9% (n=83) of the group. Entrepreneurs, or self-employed individuals, account for 11.9% (n=31), showcasing a segment of the population engaged in independent business activities. Company managers are the least represented at 1.9% (n=5), while 2.7% (n=7) of respondents chose not to disclose their professional status.

Respondents - Women (General, N=364)


7.2. Internet and Device Usage

Figure 8.2.1. Internet usage by age (N=364)



Most respondents use the internet several times a day, with the highest concentration in the 19-24 age group, comprising 60.4% (n=220) of the total sample. This indicates a strong reliance on internet usage among younger adults. For the 25-34 age group, 28% (n=101) of respondents use the internet several times a day. The 35-44 age group accounts for 6.6% (n=24) of the frequent internet users. The older age groups, 45-54 and 55-64, represent smaller segments, with 3% (n=10) and 1% (n=3), respectively. The remaining 6 respondents use the internet once a day: 2 are in the 19-24 age group, and 4 are in the 35-44 age group.

Figure 8.2.2. Social media usage (N=364)



Specifically, 95% (n=346) report using social media several times a day. This high-frequency group is primarily composed of younger individuals, with 57.5% (n=209) aged 19-24 and 27% (n=98) aged 25-34.

This high level of engagement suggests that social media is a primary source of information, communication, and social interaction for these age groups.

The majority of respondents, 85.5% (n=312), report they most often use the internet at home. Other locations, such as at work (7.5%, n=27), and public Wi-Fi networks (2%, n=8), have significantly lower usage frequencies. The use of the internet at work is more common among the 19-24 age group (4.5%, n=16), followed by the 25-34 age group (2%, n=7).

7.3. Behaviors Targeting Women Online

Awareness of Online Targeting Behaviors (N=364)

According to the survey results, the TFGBV forms that respondents are most aware of are:

- **Online Impersonation:** Someone using an individual's online accounts or creating an account using their identity.
- **Online Harassment:** Someone using sexist or hateful language toward an individual online.
- **Cyberbullying:** Someone spreading false information about an individual and/or defaming them online.
- **Cybermob:** Someone creating a large-scale negative campaign about an individual online.

According to the survey results, **52.5%** of the respondents indicated that they are aware of at least 9 out of the 12 total types of TFGBV mentioned in the survey. However, focus group discussions revealed a significant gap in perception and response among women regarding these behaviors. Despite being aware of various behaviors associated with TFGBV, **many women do not identify these behaviors as forms of gender-based violence.**

I have encountered several issues that I can now classify as TFGBV after our focus group discussion, but before that, I had no idea it was considered a form of gender-based violence.

FG discussion participant

They often perceive such behaviors as unacceptable but do not classify them as TFGBV. Furthermore, there is a lack of awareness about the actions they can take when confronted with these issues. This gap in understanding and response highlights the need for increased awareness and education on TFGBV.

The data highlights a clear trend where younger age groups, particularly those aged 19-34³³, demonstrate higher levels of awareness regarding online targeting behaviors. As age increases, awareness levels generally decrease, with older adults showing significantly lower awareness.

7.4. Perceptions Regarding the Frequency of Online Targeting Behaviors

According to the findings, a significant portion of individuals believe that abovementioned harmful behaviors are quite prevalent. For instance, approximately 53.0% of respondents perceive that the sharing or threatening to share private information (Annex C, figure 15.13) happens "Very often," while 31.6% believe it occurs "Somewhat often". Similarly, around 52.8% think that sharing or threatening to share offensive or explicit images (Annex C, figure 15.14) happens "Very often".

A notable 40.7% of respondents feel that threats of physical violence (Annex C, figure 15.15) online are frequent, and 36.9% believe they happen somewhat often.

³³ See Annex B, Awareness of Online Targeting Behaviors by Age Group

These perceptions underscore widespread concerns about online safety and the potential for harm. Moreover, many respondents (around 49.4%) believe that online activities aimed at undermining self-esteem or reputation (Annex C, figure 15.16) occur "Very often," with an additional 34.0% thinking it happens "Somewhat often".

The data also highlights significant worries about privacy and identity theft, with about 41.8% of respondents perceiving that unauthorized access to personal accounts (Annex C, figure 15.17) is a frequent issue. Similarly, 51.5% think that the misuse of someone's online identity occurs "Very often".

Sexist or hateful language is perceived as particularly prevalent online, with 63.3% of respondents thinking it happens "Very often" and 25.9% "Somewhat often". This highlights a belief in widespread online abuse that targets individuals based on gender or identity.

Overall, these numbers reveal a perception that online threats and harassment are common, reflecting a broader concern about the digital environment. The findings suggest that many individuals believe there is a significant risk of encountering such negative behaviors, indicating a need for enhanced protective measures and awareness to safeguard individuals in online spaces.

7.5. Experience with Online Targeting Behaviors

Using sexist or hateful language toward an individual online emerges as the most experienced form of TFGBV, with **15.6% of respondents indicating they have faced this type of harassment personally**. Additionally, 18.9% know someone who has been targeted, and an even larger percentage, 32.2%, have witnessed such behavior. The widespread use of sexist or hateful language online highlights the deep-seated issues of misogyny and discrimination that persist in digital spaces.

Another significant form of TFGBV reported is **sending or posting messages to undermine an individual's self-esteem or reputation**. This type of harassment has personally affected 13.0% of respondents, making it the second most common form of direct experience. Moreover, 17.8% know someone who has been targeted, and 30.4% have witnessed such behavior. This indicates that a substantial portion of individuals are exposed to efforts aimed at damaging their reputation or self-worth through online communications.

Sharing or threatening to share private information is also a notable concern, with 12.0% of respondents reporting personal experiences of such threats. The impact of this type of TFGBV extends further, as 18.8% know someone who has been targeted, and 23.9% have witnessed these threats being made against others.

The issue of **stealing an individual's password or accessing their online accounts** is another common form of TFGBV, with 11.2% of respondents having experienced it personally. This form of harassment not only invades personal privacy but can also lead to significant financial and emotional damage. With 24.3% knowing someone affected and 20.9% having witnessed such incidents, the problem of unauthorized access to online accounts is clearly widespread and calls for better security measures.

Using an individual's online accounts or creating an account using their identity is a significant concern, affecting 10.3% of respondents directly. This type of identity theft and misuse

is particularly troubling, as it can lead to a range of harmful consequences, including financial loss and reputational damage. The fact that 27.2% know someone who has been targeted and 22.8% have witnessed this behavior highlights the need for increased vigilance and protective measures against identity fraud.

Sharing or threatening to share offensive or sexually explicit images or videos is another critical form of TFGBV, with 8.8% of respondents having experienced it personally. With 22.4% knowing someone who has been targeted and 20.4% witnessing such threats, the prevalence of this form of harassment underscores the urgent need for stricter controls and protections against the non-consensual distribution of intimate content.

Spreading false information about an individual and/or defaming them online is a form of TFGBV that affects 7.4% of respondents directly. The act of spreading false information can have far-reaching consequences, damaging an individual's reputation and leading to social and professional repercussions. With 24.6% knowing someone who has been targeted and 31.0% witnessing such incidents, this highlights the harmful impact of misinformation and defamation in online spaces.

Threatening physical violence online has been experienced by 7.5% of respondents, which highlights the dangerous potential for online threats to escalate into real-world violence. The fact that 15.4% know someone who has been targeted and 25.2% have witnessed such threats indicates that online platforms are frequently used to intimidate and harass individuals.


Sending threatening emails, spreading rumors online, identity theft, or tracking an individual's internet activity is another prevalent issue, with 8.9% of respondents reporting personal experiences. This form of harassment includes a wide range of harmful activities that invade privacy and spread fear. The relatively high percentage of respondents who know someone targeted (18.5%) or have witnessed these behaviors (27.8%) further underscores the significant impact of these actions.

The data also reveals that **demanding money or sexual acts in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information** is a form of TFGBV experienced by 6.6% of respondents. This serious offense, which involves extortion and blackmail, not only violates personal privacy but also places victims in a position of severe emotional distress and potential financial exploitation. The fact that 14.4% know someone who has been targeted and 24.7% have witnessed such incidents highlights the need for stronger measures to combat this type of exploitation.

Finally, **using editing software to place one person's face onto another's body** is a form of TFGBV experienced by 2.6% of respondents. While less common, this form of harassment involves the manipulation of images to create damaging and false representations, leading to significant emotional and reputational harm. The percentage of respondents who know someone targeted (13.9%) and those who have witnessed this behavior (20.0%) suggests that even though it is less frequent, its impact can be deeply troubling and harmful.

7.6. Platforms Used for Online Targeting Behaviors

Figure 8.6.1. Online platforms where targeted behaviors are observed



Social networks emerge as the predominant platform where these behaviors targeting women are observed, with 236 respondents (87.4%) indicating it as the most common platform. Messaging services also feature prominently, with 86 respondents (31.9%) reporting these behaviors. Blogging/Community platforms are mentioned by 37

respondents (13.7%), while photo/video sharing platforms and dating apps are cited less frequently, with 15 respondents (5.6%) and 16 respondents (5.9%) respectively. Email and other platforms each received mentions from 5 respondents (2%). A portion of respondents (7.4%) found it difficult to answer, possibly reflecting uncertainty or a lack of specific knowledge about these behaviors on online platforms. These findings underscore the prevalence of these behaviors on social networks and the varied nature of their occurrence across different types of online platforms.

7.7. Personal Experience of Respondents with Online Targeting Behaviors

The data below was collected from 105 respondents who personally experienced TFGBV in any form.

Figure 8.7.1. Percentage of women who have experienced TFGBV by region





Figure 8.7.2. Percentage of Women who have experienced TFGBV by community type




The data reveals insights into where women are more likely to report experiencing TFGBV: 77.1% in urban areas compared to 20.0% in rural areas, with 2.9% finding it difficult to answer.

Figure 9.7.1 depicts the percentage of women who have experienced any form of TFGBV across different regions. Yerevan stands out with the highest incidence at 46.7%, reflecting greater digital engagement and possibly better reporting. Kotayk follows with 14.3%, and other regions like Lori


(7.6%) and Armavir (6.7%) also show moderate levels. Meanwhile, Aragatsotn and Gegharkunik have the lowest incidences among respondents at 1.9% and 2.9%, respectively. This distribution correlates with the total percentages of respondents from these regions and Yerevan, suggesting a normal distribution pattern across the surveyed areas.

Figure 8.7.3. Frequency of personal experience with online targeting



TFGBV incidents vary in frequency among respondents over the last 12 months, with a notable proportion having experienced it somewhat often (32.4%) or not very often (46.7%). Smaller percentages reported experiencing it very often (5.7%) or always (1.0%), while 14.3% found it challenging to provide a response.


Figure 8.7.4. Gender of Perpetrators



It is worth mentioning that not only men target women online. The survey results indicate that 7.6% of those who personally experienced TFGBV reported that the perpetrator targeting them was a woman, while 26.7% mentioned they were targeted by both men and women.

Additionally, focus group discussions revealed that certain forms of TFGBV, such as online hate speech, are predominantly perpetrated by women rather than men, as noted by participants.

Figure 8.7.5. Relationship with Perpetrators




Regarding the types of relationships respondents had with the perpetrators, the survey allowed for multiple responses, capturing varied contexts of interaction. The most frequently reported relationship type was offline relationships, noted by 45.4% of respondents. This suggests that a significant number of incidents of online targeting originate from individuals known to the respondents in their offline lives. Additionally, interactions with anonymous

users were reported by 37% of respondents, highlighting the anonymity that often characterizes negative online behaviors.

Less commonly reported were online relationships (17%), instances where the perpetrator(s) were unknown (28.6%), and other forms of relationships or interactions (4%). A small proportion of respondents (5.4%) chose not to disclose their relationship with the perpetrator(s). This diversity in relationship types illustrates the complex nature of online targeting, occurring across a spectrum of interpersonal dynamics and levels of anonymity.

Figure 8.7.6. Impact of online targeting



A considerable number of respondents reported feeling unsafe and experiencing emotional distress, with 60% noting mental health or emotional harm. Practical consequences such as job loss or changes (3%) and the need to change mobile numbers (19%) underscore the real-world implications of online harassment. Furthermore, TFGBV often results in social and relational strains, as evidenced by 18% reporting harm to personal relationships. Individuals (41%) also felt humiliated or embarrassed due to these experiences, reflecting the deep emotional impact. The prevalence of protective measures such as blocking contacts (56%) and creating private profiles (25.5%) highlights the proactive steps individuals take to mitigate harm.

The survey data shown in Figures 8.7.7.-8.7.16. provides insightful perspectives on protective measures adopted by respondents against online targeting. The majority of respondents either somewhat agree (34%) or strongly agree (30%) that they are more cautious about what they post online out of fear of being targeted. Utilizing the Internet and social media with a heightened level of caution reflects an awareness among women about the potential risks associated with their online presence.

Figure 8.7.7. I am more cautious about what I post online out of fear of being targeted. (N=364)




Figure 8.7.8. The Internet is a safe place for me to share my opinions and ideas. (N=364)




Figure 8.7.9. Social media should do more to address women being negatively targeted online. (N=364)




Figure 8.7.10. Women are more often targets of cyber harassment than men. (N=364)




Figure 8.7.11. More needs to be done to protect women from being negatively targeted online. (N=364)




Figure 8.7.12. I worry about negative online behavior from others impacting my real life. (N=364)




Figure 8.7.13. Women often don't know that these negative online behaviors are reportable. (N=364)




Figure 8.7.14. Women have become accustomed to being negatively targeted online, because nothing is done to stop it. (N=364)




Figure 8.7.15. I know where I can safely report negative online behavior targeting women when I experience or observe it. (N=364)






Figure 8.7.16. The Internet can be a helpful source of information and support for women dealing with these kinds of negative online behaviors. (N=364)



In addition, 70% of total respondents either somewhat or strongly disagree that the Internet is a safe place for them to share their opinions and ideas. This skepticism underscores prevalent concerns regarding online safety and the prevalence of negative behaviors directed at women.

Empowering women with knowledge about reporting mechanisms and leveraging the Internet is seen as a supportive resource but addressing key issues of online targeting management can help facilitate the safety, equity, and dignity of online spaces for women globally.

Figure 8.7.17 Protective measures and recommendations



The recommendations from Figure 8.7.17. emphasize proactive measures to enhance personal safety in digital spaces. Strategies like privacy management, cautious sharing of personal details, immediate reporting of discomfoting interactions, and leveraging offline support highlight the multifaceted approach needed to mitigate risks associated with online targeting. The high endorsement of keeping records and seeking help from offline agencies underscores the importance of preparedness and comprehensive response strategies in addressing online harassment effectively. The survey results show that respondents mainly suggest avoiding situations and actions that could lead to being targeted, a point that was mentioned also during focus group discussions.

In many cases, we unknowingly take certain actions online without realizing they can make us vulnerable to various types of gender-based violence. Taking responsibility for ourselves involves engaging in self-education and being cautious about making personal information publicly available, as this can increase our vulnerability.


FG discussion participant

Respondents – Women Entrepreneurs (N=36)

7.8. Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence in Business Sector


This section examines TFGBV within the business sector. Based on survey responses, 36 participants identified as entrepreneurs (self-employed) or company managers.

Figure 8.8.1. Frequency of internet usage in business



The chart shows that a significant majority, 69%, of respondents uses the internet for business purposes several times a day. Only a small percentage, 8%, report using it several times a month.

Figure 8.8.2. Experiences of online harassment or violence in entrepreneurial activities




When questioned about their experiences with cyberbullying or online harassment related to entrepreneurial activities, 6 out of 36 respondents (17%) reported encountering such issues. In contrast, 11 out of 36 respondents (31%) mentioned receiving unsolicited or inappropriate messages or comments from clients, customers, or business partners online. Moreover, 15 out of 36 respondents (42%) reported instances

of online sabotage, such as negative reviews or false allegations aimed at damaging their business reputation.

Business managers with more prominent webpages, who are more widely recognized, tend to attract more negative attention and criticism.

FG discussion participant


Figure 8.8.3. Response to cyberbullying or online harassment



The survey data reveals that 34% of respondents opted to ignore the harassment, while another 33% chose to block the perpetrators. This indicates a preference among affected entrepreneurs to manage the issue directly through personal actions rather than seeking external intervention. Additionally, 11% of respondents

reported the harassment to the platform or website, suggesting a minority actively engaged in formal reporting processes. Changing privacy settings on social media accounts was also a strategy employed by 22% of respondents, reflecting efforts to enhance personal online security.

Figure 8.8.4. Response to unsolicited or inappropriate messages



The majority (37%) chose to ignore unsolicited or inappropriate messages, while an equal proportion (36%) opted to block the senders. Responding directly to address the issue was another prevalent strategy, selected by 27% of respondents. Notably, formal reporting to relevant authorities or platforms was not reported by any


respondents in this group. These findings suggest a tendency among entrepreneurs to handle such incidents independently, with a lower inclination towards formal or legal actions.

There's a need for greater awareness about available tools and reporting incidents to authorities.

FG discussion participant

This trend to avoid or ignore the situation is not only indicated by the survey results but also by the results of focus group discussions.

Figure 8.8.5. Response to online sabotage




In instances of online sabotage, respondents adopted a range of strategies. Engaging with satisfied customers to counterbalance negative feedback emerged as the most common response, chosen by 26% of respondents. Respondents also implemented new strategies for reputation management online (16%) and gave public responses addressing the allegations (21%). However, formal actions like contacting platforms to dispute false claims were less common, reported by only 5% of respondents. Additionally, a significant portion (32%) indicated using other strategies not specified in the survey options. These findings highlight a proactive approach among entrepreneurs in managing online sabotage, focusing on public relations and strategic responses to mitigate reputational harm.

Insights and Connections

Across all three groups, there is a noticeable trend towards self-directed responses to online challenges, emphasizing personal actions such as blocking perpetrators and directly addressing issues. Formal reporting to platforms or authorities was less common, particularly in instances of unsolicited messages. The responses to online sabotage indicate a recognition of the broader impact on business reputation, prompting strategic measures such as engaging with customers and implementing new management strategies. Overall, the data underscores the diverse strategies employed by women entrepreneurs in navigating TFGBV and related online challenges, reflecting varying levels of preparedness and effectiveness in addressing these issues.

Figure 8.8.6. Concerns about impact of TFGBV on entrepreneurial activities




Among 36 respondents surveyed about their concern regarding TFGBV impacting their entrepreneurial activities, a majority expressed varying levels of apprehension. Specifically, ranged from slightly concerned (31%) to extremely concerned (6%). This reflects a widespread awareness among women entrepreneurs of the potential risks associated with gender-based violence in digital spaces.

Perception of platform action on TFGBV

Regarding perceptions of technology platforms and social media companies' efforts to address gender-based violence targeting women entrepreneurs, majority (75%) found it difficult to assess whether these platforms are doing enough. Only 8.5% of respondents believed current actions are sufficient, suggesting a widespread perception that existing efforts may not effectively mitigate gender-based violence online (e.g. Instagram doesn't allow closing your friend list, which makes it easy for cybercriminals to share your intimate images with your friends).

The perception of gender-based vulnerability among women entrepreneurs facing online harassment reveals mixed sentiments. Among respondents, 19.5% felt more vulnerable to online harassment or discrimination as women entrepreneurs compared to their male counterparts, while 64% did not share this view, and 16.5% found it challenging to answer.

Figure 8.8.7. Role of gender stereotypes in TFGBV




Among the surveyed, perceptions on the impact of gender role stereotypes or biases varied significantly. Some felt these had no impact (19%).

42% were uncertain or acknowledged an indirect influence.

A notable proportion acknowledged a direct impact (22%), and some mentioned stereotypes being transferred online or other impacts (8%).

Figure 8.8.8. Barriers in accessing support for TFGBV




Regarding support accessibility, over half faced no challenges (52.5%), and many felt no need for help (28.5%). Some found it hard to identify barriers (9.5%), while others reported occasional or unspecified obstacles (9.5%). These results suggest that women pursuing entrepreneurial activities may have a stronger understanding of how to approach these situations or access to resources that make

them feel supported.

Factors influencing silence on online harassment

Most of the respondents reported that they did not refrain from speaking out (86%), while a minority refrained due to fear of retaliation or victimization (14%).

Figure 8.8.9. Reasons for non-disclosure of online harassment



Among 5 respondents who refrained from speaking out about instances of online harassment or TFGBV, several factors influenced their decision. Concerns about damaging their business reputation (40%) and distrust in reporting mechanisms (40%) were common reasons cited. Additionally, 20% mentioned fear of retaliation, while a majority (60%) expressed feelings of isolation. Respondents were free to select

more than one option.

7.9. Key Insights

The survey analysis in Section 8 provides critical insights into the landscape of TFGBV and its impacts on personal and professional lives. It reveals that women across different age groups experience varying degrees of online targeting, with younger groups perceiving higher frequencies. Social networks emerged as the primary platform for online targeting, reflecting a pervasive issue across digital spaces.

Respondents expressed high concern about online harassment and dissatisfaction with current platform efforts, underscoring the need for enhanced protective measures. Personal experiences with online targeting resulted in significant emotional and mental harm, affecting job security and business reputations. Strategies for protection included online behavior, reporting mechanisms, and seeking offline support, but challenges like fear of retaliation and inadequate reporting avenues were barriers to seeking help.

Perceptions of gender vulnerability and stereotypes highlighted systemic biases that exacerbate online harassment against women entrepreneurs. Instances of online sabotage and concerns about business reputation underscored the broader implications of TFGBV on business operations and security.

Common themes around gender-based power dynamics, societal expectations, and structural inequalities persisted across different socioeconomic statuses and professional standings. Addressing TFGBV comprehensively demands tailored interventions that empower all women to access support, challenge norms, and advocate for systemic change.

The findings underscore the urgent need for comprehensive measures to enhance online safety, including improved platform accountability, enhanced reporting mechanisms, and targeted support for affected individuals. Collaborative efforts from platforms, policymakers, authorities, and communities are essential to create safer online environments that empower women entrepreneurs and safeguard their rights and dignity.

8. Focus Group Discussions Results

Experience and Observation of TFGBV in Business Networks

Focus group participants, all of whom were female, were selected from diverse business sectors, age groups, and business types to ensure a broad range of perspectives. Each group was limited to a maximum of 10 participants to maintain an effective and focused discussion environment, with a total of 21 participants involved in the study. Participants reported encountering several forms of TFGBV in their professional and business environments. Key observations include:

- **Intellectual Property Theft:** FG participants reported instances where business imagery and ideas were appropriated by other organizations. While some view intellectual property theft as a form of TFGBV due to its technology-facilitated nature, it was noted that it does not inherently constitute gender-based violence. It can sometimes include elements of TFGBV, particularly if the targeting of intellectual property is influenced by gender dynamics, but it is fundamentally a broader issue of technology-facilitated misconduct.
- **Gender Inequality:** In Armenia, gender inequality is a significant barrier for women entrepreneurs, making it difficult for them to participate fully in business activities. This inequality exacerbates the challenges they face in dealing with TFGBV. However, these barriers are increasingly being dismantled as societal attitudes shift. People are starting to recognize women as reliable entrepreneurs, largely due to women's efforts to reeducate themselves and improve their business acumen, thereby enhancing their credibility and professional standing.
- **Online Criticism and Hate Speech:** Individuals with a prominent online presence, particularly those from specific regions like Artsakh, have faced online violence, including insults and hate speech. The increased visibility of these individuals often attracts negative attention and criticism.

The participants emphasized that while they did not experience physical violence, the copying of business content and product descriptions by others was a common and problematic occurrence. This cannot be strictly classified as TFGBV, as it pertains more to issues of business ethics and intellectual property rather than gender-based violence.

Protective Measures Against TFGBV Threats

In response to TFGBV, participants highlighted several protective measures and challenges:

- **Legal and Reporting Challenges:** Seeking legal assistance is often ineffective due to the anonymity of perpetrators using fake profiles on social media platforms. This anonymity complicates the identification and accountability of those responsible for TFGBV.
- **Awareness and Education:** There is a significant lack of awareness regarding the tools available to avoid or mitigate TFGBV.
- **Cultural and Technological Obstacles:** Society's low literacy concerning social platform usage and ethical behavior is a major barrier. Participants emphasized the importance of normalizing discussions about these issues and establishing clear preventive measures to manage online negativity and violence.
- **Support Systems:** Providing emotional and practical support to victims is essential. Assessing the situation objectively and offering competent responses can help in dealing with the emotional burden of online violence.

- **Competitive Landscape:** The rapid pace of innovation and the presence of competitors pose additional challenges to businesses, making it imperative for them to adopt proactive measures to ensure safety and success.

Trends in TFGBV Prevalence

The focus group discussed the trends in TFGBV prevalence over the past year and identified several contributing factors:

- **Increasing Dynamics:** The dynamics of TFGBV are perceived to be increasing, driven by the rise of online freedom of speech and the trend of expressing opinions on the internet. This environment fosters a culture where criticism, including online violence, is more common. Additionally, advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) play a significant role in these dynamics. For instance, AI-driven technologies such as deepfake software and chatbots can be used to create and disseminate fake, derogatory content about individuals, which can exacerbate forms of TFGBV.
- **Raising Awareness:** Despite the increasing trends in TFGBV, some participants noted a contrasting trend of raising awareness and education about online violence. They highlighted that more and more awareness-raising campaigns are being released, educating people about the risks and providing them with tools to protect themselves. As a result, individuals are becoming less vulnerable to being targeted by TFGBV.

The increased awareness can lead to a potential decrease in TFGBV dynamics over time, as people become more equipped to handle and mitigate online threats.

- **Availability of Tools:** Businesses nowadays need an access to various tools that can help combat hate speech, detect fake profiles, and manage online negativity. These tools provide a measure of recourse against the increasing dynamics of TFGBV.

Collaboration to Combat TFGBV

The following points summarize participants' views on improving collaboration among businesses, government agencies, and civil society organizations to combat TFGBV targeting women and girls in the digital space:

- **Government Role:** The government should focus on regulating the legal framework and enacting laws to address online violence. This includes approving legal norms and ensuring that there is a robust legal structure to tackle TFGBV.
- **NGO and Private Sector Involvement:** NGOs can collaborate to develop toolkits and resources aimed at combating online violence. The private sector can play a crucial role in identifying and raising awareness about these issues, contributing to the overall effort to improve online safety.
- **Public Awareness and Literacy:** Effective collaboration can enhance literacy levels on online platforms, helping the public understand the risks and responsibilities associated with digital interactions. Both public and private entities should work together to raise awareness and educate the public on these issues.
- **Trust in Women Entrepreneurs:** The increasing trust in women entrepreneurs is seen as a positive development, stemming from their efforts in self-education and professional development. Their involvement in collaborative efforts against TFGBV is crucial for driving change and promoting a safer digital space.

9. Interview Results

9.1. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs of the Republic of Armenia has implemented several measures to address violence against women. These efforts focus on three main areas: support for NGOs, the provision of shelters for victims, and financial assistance.

Since 2020, the government has been providing grants to NGOs that support victims of various forms of violence, including physical and mental abuse. These NGOs offer essential services and assistance to help victims recover and find safety. In Yerevan, there are two shelters available for victims of violence. These shelters provide a safe place for individuals seeking refuge and support in their recovery.

Victims of trafficking, exploitation, and sexual violence can receive a one-time financial aid of 250,000 AMD. This financial assistance is intended to help cover some of the costs associated with their experiences. In 2023, a total of 1,800 victims were recorded, with 256 moving into shelters and 1,117 receiving financial aid.³⁴

NGOs play a crucial role in identifying victims of violence. These organizations also provide information on gender violence, including cases of technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV). Examples of TFGBV include coercion through threats involving intimate images and online harassment.

A husband subjected his wife to psychological violence by sharing sexual photos and videos on social media, posing as the woman and offering sexual services in her name. His motive was to gain an advantage in court during their separation.³⁵

These NGOs operate across different regions³⁶, offering hotlines where individuals can seek help:

- "Women's Support Center" NGO (Yerevan)
- "For equality Human Rights" NGO (Tavush region)
- "You are not alone" women's support NGO (Ararat region)
- "Youth Vanguard" Public Interest Support NGO (Armavir region)
- "Sose Women's Issues" NGO (Syunik region)
- "Talin-Huys" social NGO (Aragatsotn region)
- "You are not alone" women's support NGO (Vayots Dzor region)
- "Family without violence" NGO (Lori region)
- "Women's Empowerment Resource" NGO (Kotayk region)
- "House of Women's Rights" NGO (Kotayk region)
- "Martuni Women's Community Council" NGO (Gegharkunik Marz)

³⁴ Interview results, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of RA

³⁵ IBID

³⁶ <https://www.mlsa.am/blockpage/79>

In a separate case, a woman faced physical violence, and when she sought help from law enforcement, her husband began to harass her and her family online, sending threatening messages and comments.³⁷

One challenge faced by NGOs is their inability to refer cases directly to the police unless the victims agree to it. To improve case management, a **unified system of electronic registration for incidents of violence** has been introduced. This system aims to help to track and monitor cases more effectively.

A 20-year-old woman was coerced by her partner who initially obtained intimate photos and videos from her. He then threatened to disseminate these materials unless she complied with his demands. The woman chose not to report the incident to the police and instead reached out to the regional NGO hotline, where she received appropriate support, and the threats ceased.³⁸

Women aged 20-45, women and girls in difficult social situations, and those forcibly displaced from Artsakh are recognized as particularly vulnerable to violence.³⁹

Legal Reforms

Further strengthening the support framework, recent amendments to the Law on "Prevention of Family and Domestic Violence, Protection of Persons Subjected to Family and Domestic Violence" took effect on July 1, 2024. These changes ensure that victims of violence receive free medical care, addressing both immediate and long-term health issues. This legal provision is crucial as it guarantees that victims can access necessary medical services without financial burden, encouraging more individuals to come forward and seek help, knowing that their health needs will be met at no cost. This reform is a significant step towards providing comprehensive care and fostering an environment where victims feel supported and protected.

9.2. Human Rights Defender's Office

One of the primary functions of the Human Rights Defender's Office is to refer victims of violence to relevant entities such as NGOs and law enforcement agencies, particularly focusing on women and girls who experience violence.

In 2023, the Ombudsman's office monitored and recorded the widespread use of derogatory words and insults in public discussions, including on social platforms, which incited intolerance, hatred, hostility, and discrimination, and advocated or justified violence. Additionally, the use of insulting or degrading expressions by officials and public and political figures was also documented.⁴⁰

³⁷ Interview results, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of RA

³⁸ IBID

³⁹ IBID

⁴⁰ Annual Report On The Activities of The Human Rights Defender of The RA As The National Preventive Mechanism During The Year 2023 <https://www.ombuds.am/images/files/c21b3daa983465bea149c85cf9f2cec3.pdf>

Furthermore, in 2023, the Defender's staff documented instances of inciting hatred and promoting violence against LGBT individuals on online platforms, particularly on social networks.

Notably, on August 21, 2023, large-scale publications containing hate speech were observed in relation to the murder of a trans woman. Monitoring by the Defender's staff revealed that both the murdered woman and the trans community, in general, were subjected to posts inciting hatred and justifying violence.⁴¹

The Human Rights Defender's Office also places a specific focus on defending children's rights. It has been observed that children often recognize only physical violence as violence and do not perceive bullying, online harassment, or targeting on social platforms as forms of violence. There have also been cases where children, despite being aware that they were being subjected to violence, chose not to speak out due to fear of further targeting by society.

However, girls and women who have faced any kind of violence, including TFGBV, sometimes do not want to go to the police because they fear they will be treated negatively and may face further violence. This reluctance often stems from the close-knit nature of small villages, where everyone knows each other, and any police involvement in issues becomes widely known.

The Defender of Human Rights emphasized in her annual report that the **state should contribute to the fight against hate speech**, including in the online domain, by adopting appropriate **legislation and regulations**, ensuring the proper implementation of those regulations, raising public awareness, and building the capacities of public sector actors, officials, journalists, and others in the fields.⁴²

9.3. Police of the RA Ministry of Internal Affairs and Investigative Committee

In the case of violence, the police use three types of protection measures, two of which are directly initiated and implemented by the police. A third type of measure is initiated by victims or a victim support center, but the responsibility for implementation rests with the police. Safeguards are important to prevent further violence and protect victims.

1. The first type of protective measure is a warning, which involves evaluating three components to ensure its correct application:

- The case of domestic violence is being discovered by the police for the first time.
- The committed act does not appear to contain features of a crime.
- There are no grounds for urgent intervention.

⁴¹ Interview results, Human Rights Defender of the RA

⁴² Annual Report On The Activities of The Human Rights Defender of The RA As The National Preventive Mechanism During The Year 2023 <https://www.ombuds.am/images/files/c21b3daa983465bea149c85cf9f2cec3.pdf>

The warning is issued as soon as possible after the police become aware of the incident.

It is important to consider the risks to the victim when issuing a warning as a protective measure, particularly the possibility of retaliation by the perpetrator. When the perpetrator remains in the same environment as the victim after a warning is issued, there is a significant risk that they may seek revenge for being reported. This can exacerbate the situation, potentially leading to further harm or escalation of violence. Therefore, while a warning can be a first step in addressing domestic violence, it is crucial to monitor the situation closely and consider additional protective measures to ensure the safety and well-being of the victim.

2. The second type of protective measure is an urgent intervention decision. The purpose of this decision is to ensure the safety of the person subjected to domestic violence in cases of imminent danger by providing physical distance between them and the person who committed the violence. The validity period of the urgent intervention decision cannot exceed twenty days.

3. The third type of protective measure is a protective order. A person who has been subjected to domestic violence or a support center can apply to the court for a protective order, which can be issued only by the court and for a period exceeding the validity of the urgent intervention decision.

The police are guided by the same principles in cases of technology-facilitated violence. According to a police representative, the trend of under-reporting violent incidents is decreasing. Women, including those in rural areas, who are usually afraid to turn to the police due to the fear of breaking up their families, have started reporting violence more often. Naturally, this will also affect the number of reports of incidents of violence facilitated by technology. We can consider the main reason for this trend to be the increase in awareness and legal understanding.

The police responded that officers are regularly trained to avoid any kind of mistreatment of victims of violence. In cases of violating the rules of ethics, a police officer should held liable according to the procedure established by the law of the Republic of Armenia.⁴³

The absence of separate statistics on TFGBV cases by the Police and Investigative Committee underscores the complex nature of these incidents, often intertwined with various forms of gender-based violence (GBV). When addressing cyber-related crimes, authorities typically categorize investigations into financial cybercrimes, cybersecurity breaches, and other offenses such as child pornography, racism, xenophobia, and intellectual property violations. While technology often facilitates these crimes, **gender is not typically a determining factor in categorization**. However, gender-specific vulnerabilities are evident in TFGBV cases. Investigators note distinct patterns: male-targeted money extortion often involves perpetrators posing as women on messaging platforms, coercing payments for promised actions. Conversely, female-targeted extortion frequently utilizes phone communication, exploiting perceived vulnerabilities to demand payments.⁴⁴ These insights highlight the differential impacts of TFGBV on men and women, necessitating targeted investigative approaches and support strategies.

⁴³ Interview Results: The Police of RA

⁴⁴ Interview Results: Investigative Committee of RA

TFGBV cases often involve a combination of physical, sexual, psychological or economic violence. These forms of abuse commonly precede and/or follow incidents of TFGBV, illustrating the complex interplay within vulnerable populations. Online forms of TFGBV are linked to offline consequences, with TFGBV escalating into acts of offline violence or vice versa.

A Facebook page was created in the name of a well-known blogger, through which the perpetrator engaged with various men, arranged meetings, extorted money, and even threatened to expose their correspondence to their spouses if payments weren't made. This online harassment escalated into physical threats against the blogger, causing fear whenever they left their home, including being followed and even attempts to cause harm, such as trying to push them under a car. The situation expanded when the perpetrator exploited the blogger's fame to extort money from people displaced from Artsakh, claiming to help them rent apartments⁴⁵.

⁴⁵ Note: The case is not provided during the interviews; it is taken from the Instagram social media platform.

Study Limitations

10. Study Limitations

Cultural sensitivity and stigma | Discussing gender-based violence, especially when facilitated by technology, is a sensitive topic. Cultural norms and stigma discourage participants from openly discussing their experiences or even acknowledging the issue. In many communities, there exists a reluctance to confront or discuss topics related to gender-based violence due to deeply ingrained social norms and fear of social repercussions.

Low awareness level | During focus group discussions, participants exhibited a lack of awareness regarding TFGBV. Many had encountered situations that could be identified as TFGBV, yet they were unaware that such incidents constituted a form of gender-based violence. This gap in knowledge highlights the need for education and awareness campaigns to empower individuals to recognize and address these issues.

Underreporting | Victims of TFGBV are reluctant to report incidents due to fear of social repercussions, mistrust in authorities, or lack of awareness about available support mechanisms. This leads to an underestimation of the prevalence of the issue.

Particularly in rural areas and small villages, where community ties are strong, reporting incidents to authorities can lead to the public exposure of the victim.

Limited data availability | In Armenia, there is a notable absence of reliable data or comprehensive research on TFGBV, making it challenging to establish a foundational understanding of the issue or to compare findings across different contexts. This gap is exacerbated by the lack of a standardized definition and governmental protocols for recording TFGBV cases separately, often categorizing them under broader categories such as gender-based violence or cybercrime.

Internet inclusion and digital literacy | Varying levels of internet access and digital literacy among the population are significantly affecting the study's reach and the reliability of self-reported data on technology usage and related violence. Limited internet access in certain regions is excluding parts of the population, leading to an incomplete understanding of the issue. Additionally, differences in digital literacy are resulting in discrepancies in how participants interpret and respond to survey questions, potentially affecting the results and impacting the accuracy of the findings.

Legal and institutional framework | The absence of comprehensive laws or policies specifically addressing TFGBV poses a challenge in assessing the effectiveness of legal frameworks and institutional responses.

Participant recruitment | Identifying and recruiting FG participants who have experienced TFGBV is challenging due to privacy concerns and the sensitive nature of the topic.

Key Findings and Recommendations

11. Key Findings and Recommendations

The study conducted on the legislative landscape surrounding TFGBV in Armenia reveals significant gaps and challenges in the current legal framework. The findings underscore the need for urgent reforms to address the specific nature of digital abuses and provide adequate protection to victims.

The study reveals that there are no specific legislative provisions in Armenian law that address TFGBV. Existing legal statutes primarily focus on traditional forms of criminal behavior and interpersonal violence, such as direct physical or verbal abuse. These laws are not equipped to handle the nuances introduced by technology and digital platforms where TFGBV occurs. Current laws in Armenia that address harassment, stalking, and protection from abuse do not explicitly extend to the digital realm. This inadequacy leaves victims of digital abuse without specific legal recourse. The absence of specific legislation on TFGBV creates significant gaps in the protection available to victims. The study underscores the urgent need for legal reform to address these gaps and provide comprehensive protection against digital forms of gender-based violence.

To create a safer digital environment for women in Armenia, the study recommends the introduction of legislative initiatives or reforms informed by global best practices. These practices, discussed in detail in the preceding sections of the report, offer valuable insights into effective strategies for combating TFGBV.

Currently, there is a notable absence of official statistics on cases of TFGBV in Armenia. This term is still unfamiliar within Armenian governmental bodies, which complicates efforts to effectively address and mitigate such incidents. The lack of a concrete definition further exacerbates this issue, hindering the accurate classification and recording of TFGBV cases. Establishing a legal definition of TFGBV would not only enable better understanding and recognition of these incidents but also facilitate the systematic collection of statistics. This would be pivotal in developing targeted interventions and policies to combat TFGBV effectively.

Here are the main recommendations based on the study findings:

Customization of International Best Practices

In order to effectively incorporate international best practices into Armenia's legislative framework in the context of combating TFGBV, there is a need for customizing them to fit Armenia's specific social, cultural, and legal context. This includes defining key terms like "cyberstalking," "digital harassment," "non-consensual sharing of intimate images," and "cyber coercion" in ways that are clear and enforceable under Armenian law.

Development of Comprehensive TFGBV Legislation

In addition to integrating TFGBV into existing local legislation based on international best practices, it is recommended to develop a separate comprehensive TFGBV law, that will clearly define all forms of digital abuse, including cyberstalking, online harassment, non-consensual distribution of intimate images, and digital impersonation, etc. The legislation should also cover emerging technologies and platforms where such abuses can occur, ensuring the law remains relevant as technology evolves.

Advocacy for Istanbul Convention Ratification

There is a need for advocacy to accelerate the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, (the Istanbul Convention), which can play a significant role in addressing TFGBV in Armenia. It is one of the most comprehensive frameworks for tackling all forms of violence against women, including TFGBV. "Its broad scope covers physical, psychological, and sexual violence, and while it does not explicitly mention digital violence, the principles and measures advocated by the convention can seamlessly address TFGBV".⁴⁶

Capacity Building in Digital Forensics and Cybercrime Investigation

There is a need for developing Armenia's capacity for digital forensics and cybercrime investigation. This might include training programs for law enforcement on the latest digital technologies used in TFGBV, understanding digital evidence, and the legal procedures involved in prosecuting digital crimes. Similarly, there is a need for capacity building for law enforcement, judiciary, and legal practitioners to ensure they are equipped with the necessary skills and knowledge to handle TFGBV cases effectively. Establishing reporting mechanisms specifically tailored to TFGBV cases and integrating these into existing frameworks will be crucial. Furthermore, initiating data collection and analysis protocols focused on TFGBV will provide vital insights into the scope and nature of the issue, guiding evidence-based policymaking and intervention strategies. By taking these steps, Armenia can lay a solid foundation for combating TFGBV effectively and protecting vulnerable individuals in the digital age.

Public Awareness Campaign on TFGBV

Raising public awareness about TFGBV is a critical step that should precede and accompany legal amendments to ensure acceptance and minimize resistance to change, especially in a culturally specific context like Armenia. A well-crafted public awareness campaign can educate the community about the serious impacts of TFGBV and the necessity for legal measures, while also addressing cultural nuances and sensitivities.

Implementation of Educational Initiatives for Online Safety

In addition to legal amendments and public awareness campaigns, it is essential to implement comprehensive educational initiatives aimed at promoting online safety. These initiatives should educate individuals on recognizing and preventing TFGBV, emphasizing the importance of digital privacy, secure online behavior, and seeking support when faced with online threats. By integrating online safety education into broader awareness efforts, we can empower communities to navigate digital spaces safely and mitigate the risks of TFGBV.

Further Research on Digital Exclusion and Control

The current report addresses online violence within digital platforms and the internet. However, to comprehensively address TFGBV, especially concerning restrictions or control of technology access, further investigation is crucial. It is recommended to initiate separate research specifically dedicated to understanding digital exclusion and its root causes. Future research should gather

⁴⁶ <https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbul-convention>

information from individuals experiencing limited internet and device usage. This would illuminate underlying factors such as affordability, access issues, digital literacy challenges, and potential barriers related to disability. Additionally, exploring instances of digital and physical control over device access by family members or partners is vital. While the current survey provides details on basic forms of TFGBV, studying the issue with a broader scope will offer a more comprehensive understanding and aid in developing targeted interventions.

Fostering Cooperation between Different Entities

To effectively combat TFGBV in Armenia, it is essential to foster robust cooperation between various entities, including international organizations, national ministries, the Statistical Committee of RA, law enforcement bodies, and both private and public sectors. This multi-sectoral collaboration should be formalized through joint protocols to ensure a coordinated and comprehensive approach to TFGBV prevention and response.

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Annexes

12. Annex A: Summary of Key Findings

Table 13.1: Laws and regulations addressing TFGBV across selected countries

	Canada	USA	Netherlands	Sweden	Denmark
Online Harassment/Cyberstalking	<p>Section 264 of the Criminal Code</p> <p>Section 184 of the Criminal Code</p> <p>Section 301 of the Criminal Code</p> <p>Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act</p> <p>The Privacy Act</p> <p>The Defamation Act</p>	<p>National Plan to End Gender Based Violence</p> <p>Violence Against Women Act</p>	<p>Section 285 of the Criminal Code</p> <p>Section 138 of the Criminal Code</p> <p>Section 139(A-E) of the Criminal Code</p>	<p>Section 6A of the Criminal Code</p> <p>Section 9A of the Criminal Code</p>	<p>Section 232 of the Criminal Code</p> <p>Section 263 of the Criminal Code</p>
Image-Based Abuse	<p>Section 162 of the Criminal Code</p> <p>Protecting Canadians from Online Crime Act</p> <p>Provincial Statutes on the Unauthorized Distribution of Intimate Images</p>	<p>State Laws Against Non-Consensual Distribution of Intimate Images</p>	X	<p>Section 6C of the Criminal Code</p>	<p>Section 264D of the Criminal Code</p>
Online Impersonation	<p>Section 346 of the Criminal Code</p>	<p>Computer Fraud and Abuse Act</p> <p>Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act</p> <p>State Laws Banning Sexual Extortion (Applicable in 17 States)</p>	X	X	X
Coercive Behaviour	X	X	X	<p>Section 4 of the Criminal Code</p>	<p>Sections 217, 260, 276 of the Criminal Code</p>

13. Annex B: Survey Questionnaire

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE IN ORIGINAL LANGUAGE (ARMENIAN)

Ժողովրդագրություն

1. Ներկայումս ո՞ր մարզում եք բնակվում: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*
 - Արարատ
 - Արմավիր
 - Արագածոտն
 - Լոռի
 - Տավուշ
 - Շիրակ
 - Սյունիք
 - Վայոց Ձոր
 - Կոտայք
 - Գեղարքունիք
 - Երևան
2. Նշե՞ք Ձեր բնակավայրի տեսակը: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*
 - Զաղաքային բնակավայր
 - Գյուղական բնակավայր
 - Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել
3. Նշե՞ք սեռը:
 - Արական [ավարտել հարցումը]
 - Իգական
4. Ո՞ր տարիքային խմբին եք պատկանում:
 - Մինչև 14 տարեկան [ավարտել հարցումը]
 - 15-19
 - 20-24
 - 25-34
 - 35-44
 - 45-54
 - 55-64
 - 65 և ավել [ավարտել հարցումը]
5. Նշե՞ք Ձեր աշխատանքային ներկայիս կարգավիճակը: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*
 - Լրիվ դրույքով աշխատող
 - Կես դրույքով աշխատող

- Ինքնագբաղված անձ
- Գործազուրկ, ով փնտրում է աշխատանք
- Թռչակառու
- Աշակերտ/ուսանող (չաշխատող)
- Ինքնակամ չաշխատող (տնային տնտեսուհի և այլն)
- Հրաժարվում եմ պատասխանել

6. Նշված խմբերից ո՞րն է ամենալավը բնութագրում Ձեր ներկայիս զբաղվածությունը: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Ձեռնարկատեր, անհատ ձեռներեց
- Ընկերության ղեկավար/կառավարիչ
- Ստորաբաժանման ղեկավար (միջին օղակ)
- Ոլորտային մասնագետ/փորձագետ
- Արհեստավոր/ձեռագործ աշխատանքի վարպետ
- Սպասարկման ոլորտի աշխատող, գործարանի աշխատող
- Հրաժարվում եմ պատասխանել
- Այլ

6.1. Այլի դեպքում նշել պատասխան:

Համացանցի և սարքերի օգտագործում, եթե Q6 = 3,4,5,6,7,8

7. Ի՞նչ հաճախականությամբ եք օգտվում համացանցից: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Օրական մի քանի անգամ
- Օրական մեկ անգամ
- Շաբաթը մի քանի անգամ
- Շաբաթը մեկ անգամ
- Ամիսը մի քանի անգամ
- Ամիսը մեկ անգամ կամ ավելի քիչ [ավարտել հարցումը]

8. Որքա՞ն հաճախ եք օգտվում համացանցից՝ մուտք գործելու համար սոցիալական մեդիա կամ սոցիալական ցանցային հարթակներ (օրինակ՝ ինտերնետային հավելվածներ, սոցիալական ցանցեր, ծանոթությունների հավելվածներ և այլն): *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Օրական մի քանի անգամ
- Օրական մեկ անգամ
- Շաբաթը մի քանի անգամ
- Շաբաթը մեկ անգամ
- Ամիսը մի քանի անգամ
- Ամիսը մեկ անգամ կամ ավելի քիչ [ավարտել հարցումը]

9. Որտե՞ղ եք առավել հաճախ օգտվում համացանցից: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Տանը

- Ընկերների կամ բարեկամների տանը
- Համալսարանում
- Աշխատավայրում
- Սրճարան, քոփորքինգ տարածք
- Հանրային վայր՝ համացանցին հասանելիությամբ
- Այլ, նշել

Չափողական հարցեր

10. Որքանո՞վ եք տեղյակ վարքագծային հետևյալ դրսևորումների մասին, որոնք օգտագործվում են կանանց առցանց թիրախավորման համար: *Յուրաքանչյուր պնդման համար ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

10.1. Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց տարածում կամ սպառնում է տարածել անհատի մասին անձնական տեղեկություններ:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.2. Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց տարածում կամ սպառնում է տարածել վիրավորական, կիսամերկ, մերկ, ինտիմ կամ սեռական բնույթի լուսանկարներ/տեսանյութեր:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.3. Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց սպառնում է ֆիզիկական բռնություն կիրառել անձի կամ անձի հարազատների նկատմամբ:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.4. Ինչ-որ մեկը հաղորդագրություն է ուղարկում կամ հրապարակում կատարում՝ նպատակ ունենալով իջեցնել անհատի ինքնագնահատականը կամ վնաս հասցնել նրա հեղինակությանը:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.5. Ինչ-որ մեկը գողանում է անհատի գաղտնաբառը և/կամ մուտք է գործում նրա առցանց հաշիվներ, ինտերնետ սարքեր և այլն:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.6. Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է այլ առցանց հաշիվները կամ ստեղծում է հաշիվ՝ ներկայանալով այդ անձի անունից:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.7. Ինչ-որ մեկը անհատի հասցեին առցանց ուղղում է սեքսիստական կամ ատելության խոսք:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.8. Ինչ-որ մեկը սուտ տեղեկություններ է առցանց տարածում անհատի մասին և/կամ զրպարտում նրան:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.9. Ինչ-որ մեկը անհատի մասին առցանց տարածում է հեղինակագրկող տեղեկատվություն («սև փիառ»):

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.10. Ինչ-որ մեկը սպառնացող նամակներ է ուղարկում, բամբասանքներ է առցանց տարածում, պարբերաբար հետևում է անձի ինտերնետային գործունեությանը (կրկնվող վարքագիծ)՝ վատ նպատակներ հետապնդելով:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.11. Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է համացանցը՝ պահանջելով գումար, սեքսուալ բնույթի գործողություններ կամ ինտիմ լուսանկարներ/տեսանյութեր՝ անձնական տեղեկություններ կամ ունեցած ինտիմ լուսանկարները/տեսանյութերը չհրապարակելու դիմաց:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

10.12. Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է համակարգչային ծրագրեր կամ այլ միջոցներ (բջջային հավելվածներ, կայքեր)՝ անձի դեմքը մեկ այլ անձի լուսանկարում/տեսանյութում տեղադրելու նպատակով:

- Բացարձակապես տեղյակ չեմ
- Որոշ չափով տեղյակ եմ
- Բավարար տեղյակ եմ
- Լավ տեղյակ եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11. Ի՞նչ եք կարծում, որքան հաճախ են կանայք առցանց թիրախավորվում հետևյալ վարքագծերի միջոցով:
Յուրաքանչյուր պնդման համար ընտրել մեկ պատասխան

11.1. [Եթե Q10.1 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց տարածում կամ սպառնում է տարածել անհատի մասին անձնական տեղեկություններ:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.2. [Եթե Q10.2 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց տարածում կամ սպառնում է տարածել վիրավորական, կիսամերկ, մերկ, ինտիմ կամ սեռական բնույթի լուսանկարներ/տեսանյութեր:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.3. [Եթե Q10.3 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց սպառնում է ֆիզիկական բռնություն կիրառել անձի կամ անձի հարազատների նկատմամբ:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.4. [Եթե Q10.4 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը հաղորդագրություն է ուղարկում կամ հրապարակում կատարում նպատակ ունենալով իջեցնել անհատի ինքնագնահատականը կամ վնաս հասցնել հեղինակությանը:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.5. [Եթե Q10.5 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը գողանում է անհատի գաղտնաբառը և/կամ մուտք է գործում նրա առցանց հաշիվներ, ինտերնետ սարքեր և այլն:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.6. [Եթե Q10.6 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է այլ առցանց հաշիվները կամ ստեղծում է հաշիվ՝ ներկայանալով այդ անձի անունից:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.7. [Եթե Q10.7 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը անհատի հասցեին առցանց ուղղում է սեքսիստական կամ աստելության խոսք:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.8. [Եթե Q10.8 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը սուտ տեղեկություններ է առցանց տարածում անհատի մասին և/կամ զրպարտում նրան:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.9. [Եթե Q10.9 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը անհատի մասին առցանց տարածում է հեղինակագրկող տեղեկատվություն («սև փիամ») :

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.10. [Եթե Q10.10 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը սպառնացող նամակներ է ուղարկում, բամբասանքներ է առցանց տարածում, պարբերաբար հետևում է անձի ինտերնետային գործունեությանը (կրկնվող վարքագիծ)՝ վատ նպատակներ հետապնդելով:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.11. [Եթե Q10.11 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է համացանցը՝ պահանջելով գումար, սեքսուալ բնույթի գործողություններ կամ ինտիմ լուսանկարներ/տեսանյութեր՝ անձնական տեղեկություններ կամ ունեցած ինտիմ լուսանկարները/տեսանյութերը չհրապարակելու դիմաց:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

11.12. [Եթե Q10.12 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է համակարգչային ծրագրեր կամ այլ միջոցներ (բջջային հավելվածներ, կայքեր)՝ անձի դեմքը մեկ այլ անձի լուսանկարում/տեսանյութում տեղադրելու նպատակով:

- Երբեք
- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12. Վերջին 12 ամիսների ընթացքում որքանով եք դուք անձամբ առնչվել և/կամ ականատես եղել հետևյալ վարքագծերի դրսևորմանը, որոնք օգտագործվում են կանանց առցանց թիրախավորման համար:
Յուրաքանչյուր պնդման համար ընտրել մեկ պատասխան

12.1. [Եթե Q10.1 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց տարածում կամ սպառնում է տարածել անհատի մասին անձնական տեղեկություններ:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.2. [Եթե Q10.2 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց տարածում կամ սպառնում է տարածել վիրավորական, կիսամերկ, մերկ, ինտիմ կամ սեռական բնույթի լուսանկարներ/տեսանյութեր:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.3. [Եթե Q10.3 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը առցանց սպառնում է ֆիզիկական բռնություն կիրառել անձի կամ անձի հարազատների նկատմամբ:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.4. [Եթե Q10.4 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը հաղորդագրություն է ուղարկում կամ հրապարակում կատարում նպատակ ունենալով իջեցնել անհատի ինքնագնահատականը կամ վնաս հասցնել հեղինակությանը:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.5. [Եթե Q10.5 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը գողանում է անհատի գաղտնաբառը և/կամ մուտք է գործում նրա առցանց հաշիվներ, ինտերնետ սարքեր և այլն:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել

- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.6. [Եթե Q10.6 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է այլ առցանց հաշիվները կամ ստեղծում է հաշիվ՝ ներկայանալով այդ անձի անունից:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.7. [Եթե Q10.7 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը անհատի հասցեին առցանց ուղղում է սեքսիստական կամ ատելության խոսք:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.8. [Եթե Q10.8 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը սուտ տեղեկություններ է առցանց տարածում անհատի մասին և/կամ զրպարտում նրան:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.9. [Եթե Q10.9 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը անհատի մասին առցանց տարածում է հեղինակագրկող տեղեկատվություն («սև փիառ»):

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.10. [Եթե Q10.10 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը սպառնացող նամակներ է ուղարկում, բամբասանքներ է առցանց տարածում, պարբերաբար հետևում է անձի ինտերնետային գործունեությանը (կրկնվող վարքագիծ)՝ վատ նպատակներ հետապնդելով:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.11. [Եթե Q10.11 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է համացանցը՝ պահանջելով գումար, սեքսուալ բնույթի գործողություններ կամ ինտիմ լուսանկարներ/տեսանյութեր՝ անձնական տեղեկություններ կամ ունեցած ինտիմ լուսանկարները/տեսանյութերը չհրապարակելու դիմաց:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

12.12. [Եթե Q10.12 = 2,3,4] Ինչ-որ մեկը օգտագործում է համակարգչային ծրագրեր կամ այլ միջոցներ (բջջային հավելվածներ, կայքեր) անձի դեմքը մեկ այլ անձի լուսանկարում/տեսանյութում տեղադրելու նպատակով:

- Անձամբ թիրախավորվել եմ
- Ճանաչում եմ մեկին, ով թիրախավորվել է
- Ականատես եմ եղել, թե ինչպես է մեկ ուրիշը թիրախավորվում
- Անձամբ չեմ թիրախավորվել և ուրիշի թիրախավորմանն ականատես չեմ եղել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

13. Վերջին 1 տարվա ընթացքում ո՞ր առցանց հարթակներում եք առավել հաճախ բախվել և/կամ ականատես եղել վերևում թվարկված վարքագծերին: *Ընտրել բոլոր կիրառելի տարբերակները*

- Սոցիալական ցանցեր (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, LinkedIn և այլն)
- Լուսանկարներ/տեսանյութեր հրապարակող հարթակներ (YouTube, Pinterest և այլն)
- Բլոգներ (News.am, Myinfo.am և այլն)
- Հաղորդագրությունների համար հավելվածներ (Messenger, WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram և այլն)
- Ծանոթությունների հավելվածներ (Tinder, Barev և այլն)
- Էլեկտրոնային փոստ
- Այլ, նշել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

14. [Եթե Q12.X=1] Վերջին 1 տարվա ընթացքում որքա՞ն հաճախ է անձամբ Ձեր նկատմամբ դրսևորվել նման վարքագիծ: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Հազվադեպ
- Երբեմն
- Հաճախ
- Անընդհատ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

15. [Եթե Q12.X=1] Իսկողում ենք նշել վերջին 1 տարվա ընթացքում Ձեր հանդեպ նման վարքագիծ դրսևորած անձի սեռը:

- Արական
- Իգական

- Երկուսն էլ

16. [Եթե Q12.X=1] Երբ Դուք անձամբ բախվել եք նման վարքագծի հետ, ինչպիսի՞ հարաբերություններ եք ունեցել այն անձի հետ, ով թիրախավորել է Ձեզ: *Ընտրել բոլոր կիրառելի տարբերակները*

- Անձ, ում ես ճանաչում եմ անձամբ
- Անձ, ում ես ճանաչում եմ առցանց
- Ինձ անծանոթ անձ
- Անանուն օգտատերեր
- Այլ, ինդրում ենք նշել
- Հրաժարվում եմ պատասխանել

17. [Եթե Q12.X=1] Որո՞նք են եղել ամենազդեցիկ հետևանքները, եթե այդպիսիք կան, որոնք առաջացել են Ձեր հանդեպ վերոնշյալ վարքագծերի դրսևորման արդյունքում: *Ընտրել բոլոր կիրառելի տարբերակները*

- Որևէ հրապարակում անելուց առաջ երկմտում եմ
- Նվազեցրել եմ իմ առցանց ակտիվությունը
- Արգելափակել եմ կոնտակտներ/անձանց
- Ստեղծել եմ նոր, փակ օգտահաշիվ/պրոֆիլ
- Դադարել եմ օգտագործել տվյալ առցանց հարթակը
- Փոխել եմ անձնական հեռախոսահամարս
- Վարքագծի մասին տեղեկացրել/բողոքել եմ առցանց հարթակին
- Վարքագծի մասին տեղեկացրել/բողոքել եմ իրավապահ մարմիններին
- Ես ինձ ոչ ապահով եմ զգացել
- Ընտանիքս իրեն ոչ ապահով է զգացել
- Հոգեկան առողջությանս վնաս է հասցվել
- Ոչ առցանց/ֆիզիկական վնաս է հասցվել
- Ունեցել եմ նվաստացված լինելու/ամոթի զգացում
- Կորցրել եմ կամ ստիպված եմ եղել փոխել աշխատանքս
- Անձնական հարաբերություններիս վնաս է պատճառվել
- Այլ, նշել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18. Որքանո՞վ եք համաձայն հետևյալ պնդումների հետ: *Յուրաքանչյուր հարցի համար ընտրել մեկ պատասխան:*

18.1 Ես զգուշավոր եմ առցանց հրապարակումներիս հարցում՝ վախենալով թիրախավորվելուց:

- Բացարձակապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.2 Համացանցն ինձ համար ապահով վայր է իմ կարծիքներն ու գաղափարները կիսելու համար:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.3 Սոցիալական մեդիա հարթակները պետք է ավելի հետևողական լինեն՝ անդրադառնալով առցանց բացասաբար թիրախավորված կանանց:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.4 Կանայք ավելի հաճախ են դառնում առցանց ոտնձգությունների թիրախ, քան տղամարդիկ:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.5 Պետք է ավելի շատ քայլեր ձեռնարկվեն՝ կանանց առցանց բացասական թիրախավորումից պաշտպանելու համար:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.6 Առցանց թիրախավորված լինելու դեպքում՝ դրան վերջ դնելու կամ օգնություն ստանալու համար կանանց հնարավորությունները սահմանափակ են:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.7 Ինձ անհանգստացնում է ուրիշների կողմից առցանց բացասական վարքագծի դրսևորումն, որն ունի իմ իրական կյանքի վրա ազդեցություն:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ

- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.8 Կանայք հաճախ անտեղյակ են, որ նման բացասական առցանց վարքագիծերին առնչվելու դեպքում կարող են օգնության դիմել:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.9 Կանայք համակերպվել են համացանցում բացասական թիրախ դառնալու հետ, քանի որ դա կանգնեցնելու համար քայլեր չեն ձեռնարկվում:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.10 Տեղյակ եմ, թե որտեղ կարող եմ ապահով կերպով զեկուցել կանանց նկատմամբ բացասական առցանց վարքագիծի մասին, երբ անձամբ բախվեմ կամ ականատես լինեմ դրան:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

18.11 Համացանցը կարող է տեղեկատվության և աջակցության օգտակար աղբյուր լինել այն կանանց համար, ովքեր առնչվում են այս տեսակի բացասական առցանց վարքագծերին:

- Բացարձականապես համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն չեմ
- Ավելի շատ համաձայն եմ
- Լիովին համաձայն եմ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

19. Ի՞նչ խորհուրդ կտայիք ձեզ նման այլ կանանց առցանց թիրախավորումից պաշտպանվելու համար: Ընտրել բոլոր կիրառելի տարբերակները:

- Ձեր պրոֆիլը/տեղեկատվությունը գաղտնի պահե՞ք
- Մի հրապարակեք տեղեկատվություն Ձեր գտնվելու վայրի վերաբերյալ

- Մի տրամադրեք Ձեր հեռախոսահամարը կամ այլ կոնտակտներ ոչ վստահելի անձանց
- Եթե ինչ-որ մեկը Ձեզ անհանգստացնում է, անմիջապես զեկուցե՛ք այդ մասին
- Առցանց տիրույթում/Ձեր շրջապատում պատմե՛ք Ձեզ թիրախավորած անձի և նրա վարքագծի մասին
- Անհրաժեշտության դեպքում դիմե՛ք համապատասխան մարմինների, ովքեր կպաշտպանեն Ձեզ
- Պահպանե՛ք Ձեզ թիրախավորած անձից ստացած նամակները, լուսանկարները, տեսանյութերը, կատարած գրառումները՝ որպես ապացույց
- Այլ, նշել
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

Ձեռնարկատիրական գործունեություն Եթե Q6=1/2

20. Որքա՞ն հաճախ եք օգտագործում համացանցը Ձեր բիզնես գործունեության հետ կապված: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Օրական մեկ անգամ
- Օրական մի քանի անգամ
- Շաբաթը մի քանի անգամ
- Շաբաթը մեկ անգամ
- Ամիսը մի քանի անգամ
- Ամիսը մեկ անգամ կամ ավելի քիչ [ավարտել հարցումը]
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել [ավարտել հարցումը]

21. Ձեր բիզնես գործունեության հետ կապված երբևէ բախվե՞լ եք կիբեռհարձակման կամ առցանց ոտնձգությունների որևէ ձևի: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Այո
- Ոչ

22. [Եթե Q24=այո] Ինչպե՞ս եք արձագանքել կիբեռհարձակմանը կամ առցանց ոտնձգություններին: *Ընտրել բոլոր կիրառելի տարբերակները*

- Անտեսեցի այն
- Չեկուցեցի տվյալ հարթակին/կայքին
- Արգելափակեցի «հանցագործին/ներին»
- Դիմեցի ընկերներին/ ընտանիքիս
- Դիմեցի իրավապահ մարմիններին
- Սոցիալական ցանցերում փոխեցի գաղտնիության տվյալները (գաղտնաբառ և այլն)
- Այլ, նշել

23. Դուք երբևէ առցանց ստացե՞լ եք տհաճ, ոչ պատշաճ հաղորդագրություններ կամ մեկնաբանություններ հաճախորդներից կամ բիզնես գործընկերներից: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Այո
- Ոչ

24. Եթե այո, ինչպե՞ս եք վարվել այդ հաղորդագրությունները կամ մեկնաբանությունները ստանալուց հետո: *Ընտրել բոլոր կիրառելի տարբերակները*

- Անտեսել եմ դրանք
- Ուղիղ արձագանքել եմ՝ անդրադառնալով խնդրին
- Արգելափակել եմ ուղարկողին
- Միջադեպի մասին հայտնել եմ համապատասխան մարմիններին կամ հարթակներին
- Իրավական ընթացք եմ սովել միջադեպին
- Այլ, նշել

25. Որքանո՞վ է Ձեզ անհանգստացնում տեխնոլոգիաների միջոցով կիրառվող գեռադեպի բռնության ազդեցությունը Ձեր բիզնես գործունեության վրա: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Բացարձակապես չի անհանգստացնում
- Մի փոքր անհանգստացնում է
- Ոչ անհանգստացնում է, ոչ էլ հակառակը
- Անհանգստացնում է
- Չափազանց անհանգստացնում է

26. Ի՞նչ եք կարծում, տեխնոլոգիական հարթակները և սոցիալական մեդիա ցանցերը բավարար ջանքեր գործադրո՞ւմ են կին ձեռներեցների նկատմամբ գեռադեպի բռնության կանխարգելման և դրա դեմ պայքարելու համար: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Այո
- Ոչ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

27. Երբևէ առցանց հարթակներում առնչվե՞լ եք բացասական կարծիքների, կեղծ մեղադրանքների, որոնք նպատակաուղղված են եղել ձեր բիզնեսի համբավին վնասելուն: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Այո
- Ոչ

28. Ինչպե՞ս եք վարվել նմանատիպ կարծիքներ և մեղադրանքներ ստանալուց հետո: *Ընտրել բոլոր կիրառելի տարրերակները*

- Արձագանքել եմ հրապարակայնորեն
- Կապվել եմ հարթակի/կայքի հետ՝ կեղծ մեղադրանքները վիճարկելու համար
- Կենտրոնացել եմ մյուս հաճախորդներից դրական կարծիքների շատացման վրա՝ դրականը և բացասականը հավասարակշռելու համար
- Փնտրել եմ իրավաբանական խորհրդատվություն/օգնություն
- Ներդրել եմ հեղինակության առցանց կառավարման նոր ռազմավարություն
- Այլ, նշել

29. Չգո՞ւմ եք, որ կին ձեռներեց լինելը Ձեզ ավելի խոցելի է դարձնում առցանց ոտնձգությունների կամ խտրականության հարցում՝ համեմատած տղամարդ ձեռներեցների հետ: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Այո
- Ոչ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել

30. Որքանով են ազդում գեղեցիկ կարծրատիպերը և կողմնակալությունը տեխնոլոգիաների միջոցով կին ձեռներեցների նկատմամբ գեղեցիկ բռնության առաջացման վրա: Խնդրում ենք կիսվել ձեր մտքերով:

31. Բիզնես գործունեության հետ կապված տեխնոլոգիաների միջոցով իրականացվող գեղեցիկ բռնության հետ առնչվելու դեպքում, երբևէ խոչընդոտներ ունեցե՞լ եք օգնություն ստանալու հետ կապված: Խնդրում ենք կիսվել ձեր փորձով:

32. Երբևէ լռե՞լ եք Ձեր՝ որպես կին ձեռներեցի, նկատմամբ առցանց ոտնձգությունների կամ գեղեցիկ բռնության դեպքերի մասին՝ հետագայում վրեժխնդրության կամ թիրախավորված լինելու վախի պատճառով: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Այո
- Ոչ

33. Եթե այո, ապա ո՞ր գործոններ են նպաստել առցանց ոտնձգությունների կամ բռնության մասին լռելու ձեր որոշմանը: *Ընտրել բոլոր կիրառելի տարբերակները*

- Իմ գործարար համբավը հետագայում վնասելու վերաբերյալ մտահոգությունները
- Բարձրաձայնելու հետևանքով իրավական պատասխանատվության ենթարկվելու վախը
- Նման հարցերով զբաղվող լիազոր կառույցների աշխատանքի հանդեպ վստահության բացակայությունը
- Հանցագործի՝ վրեժխնդիր լինելու վախը
- Խնդիրներս լուծելու հարցում աջակցություն չունենալու զգացումը
- Այլ, նշել

34. Ստորև նշված միջակայքերից ո՞րն է առավել համապատասխանում Ձեր ընտանեկան համախառն եկամտի չափին: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Մինչև 99 999 ՀՀ դրամ
- 100 000-249 999 ՀՀ դրամ
- 250 000-499 999 ՀՀ դրամ
- 500 000-999 999 ՀՀ դրամ
- 1 000 000-2 499 999 ՀՀ դրամ
- 2 500 000 և ավելի ՀՀ դրամ
- Դժվարանում եմ պատասխանել
- Հրաժարվում եմ պատասխանել

35. Զանի՞ հոգի կա Ձեր ընտանիքում (ներառյալ Ձեզ):

36. Ո՞րն է Ձեր ստացած (ավարտած) կրթության ամենաբարձր մակարդակը: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

- Բարձրագույն կամ հետբուհական
- Միջին մասնագիտական
- Նախնական մասնագիտական
- Միջնակարգ/ավագ դպրոց (1-12 դասարաններ)
- Որևէ կրթական աստիճանում ընդգրկված չեմ եղել
- Հրաժարվում եմ պատասխանել

37. Աշխարհի զեղարկուող ընտանեկան կարգավիճակը: *Ընտրել մեկ պատասխան*

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH TRANSLATION)

Demographic & screening questions

1. In which marz do you live? *Select one.*
 - Ararat
 - Armavir
 - Aragatsotn
 - Lori
 - Tavush
 - Shirak
 - Syunik
 - Vayots Dzor
 - Kotayk
 - Gegharkunik
 - Yerevan
2. Which of the following best describes the community in which you live? *Select one.*
 3. In a city/urban area
 - In a rural area
 - Difficult to answer
4. What is your gender?
 - Male
 - Female
5. Which age group do you belong to?
 - Younger than 18
 - 19 – 24
 - 25 – 34
 - 35 – 44
 - 45 – 54
 - 55 – 64
 - 65 and older
6. What is your current employment status? *Select one.*
 - Full-time employee
 - Part-time employee
 - Self-employed
 - Not employed, seeking opportunities currently 1 000 000-2 500 000
 - Retired
 - Student (unemployed)
 - Not working by choice (homemaker, etc.)
 - Refuse to answer
7. Which of the following categories best describes your current occupation? *Select one.*
 - Entrepreneur (self-employed)
 - Company manager
 - Head of Department (middle level)
 - Field specialist/expert
 - Artisan/Craftsperson
 - Service and factory worker
 - Refuse to answer
 - Other

6.1 If other, please specify.

Internet and devices usage, IF Q6 = 3,4,5,6,7,8

8. How often do you use the Internet? *Select one.*
 - Several times a day
 - Once a day
 - Several times a week
 - Once a week
 - Several times a month
 - Once a month or less [TERMINATE]
9. How often do you use the Internet to access social media or social networking platforms (e.g., web applications, social networks, dating apps, etc.)?
 - Several times a day
 - Once a day
 - Several times a week
 - Once a week
 - Several times a month
 - Once a month or less [TERMINATE]
10. Where do you most often use the Internet?
 - At home
 - At the home of a friend or family member
 - At university
 - At work
 - Cafes, coworking spaces
 - Public Wi-Fi network
 - Other

Measurement questions

10. To what extent are you aware of the following behaviors being used to target women online?
 - 10.1. Someone sharing or threatening to share private information about an individual online (Doxing).
 - Not at all aware
 - Slightly aware
 - Moderately aware
 - Very aware
 - Difficult to answer
 - 10.2. Someone sharing or threatening to share offensive or sexually explicit images/videos of an individual online (Image-based abuse).
 - Not aware at all
 - Slightly aware
 - Moderately aware
 - Very aware
 - Difficult to answer
 - 10.3. Someone threatening physical violence online against an individual or their relatives (Cybermob).
 - Not aware at all
 - Slightly aware
 - Moderately aware
 - Very aware
 - Don't know/Difficult to answer
 - 10.4. Someone sending or posting messages to undermine an individual's self-esteem or reputation (Cyberbullying).
 - Not aware at all

- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

10.5. Someone stealing an individual's password and/ or accessing their online accounts, Internet devices, etc (Online impersonation).

- Not aware at all
- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

10.6. Someone using an individual's online accounts or creating an account using their identity (Online impersonation).

- Not aware at all
- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

10.7. Someone, using sexist or hateful language toward an individual online (Online harassment).

- Not aware at all
- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

10.8. Someone spreading false information about an individual and/or defaming them online (Cyberbullying).

- Not aware at all
- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

10.9. Someone creating a large-scale negative campaign about an individual online (Cybermob)

- Not aware at all
- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

10.10. Someone sending threatening emails, spreading rumors online, identity theft, or tracking an individual's internet activity (repeated behaviors) (Cyberstalking).

- Not aware at all
- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

10.11. Someone using electronic means demanding money, sexual acts, or additional explicit images in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information. (Sextortion).

- Not aware at all
- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

10.12. Someone using editing software or other tools to place one person's face onto another's body or other similar actions

(Shallowfake).

- Not aware at all
- Slightly aware
- Moderately aware
- Very aware
- Difficult to answer

11. How often do you believe women are targeted online through the following behaviors?

11.1. [If Q10.1 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone sharing or threatening to share private information

about an individual online (Doxxing).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.2. [If Q10.2 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone sharing or threatening to share offensive or sexually

explicit images/videos of an individual online (Image-based abuse).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.3. [If Q10.3 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone threatening physical violence online against an

individual or their relatives (Cybermob).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.4. [If Q10.4 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone sending or posting messages to undermine an

individual's self-esteem or Reputation (Cyberbullying).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.5. [If Q10.5 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone stealing an individual's password and/or accessing

their online accounts, Internet devices, etc. (Online impersonation).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.6. [If Q10.6 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone using an individual's online accounts or creating an

account using their identity (Online impersonation).

- Not at all often
- Not very often

- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.7. [If Q10.7 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone, using sexist or hateful language toward an individual online (Online harassment).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.8. [If Q10.8 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone spreading false information about an individual and/or defaming them online (Cyberbullying).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.9. [If Q10.9 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone creating a negative campaign about an individual online (Cybermob).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.10. [If Q10.10 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone sending threatening emails, spreading rumors online, identity theft, or tracking an individual's internet activity (repeated behaviors) (Cyberstalking).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.11. [If Q10.11 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone using electronic means demanding money, sexual acts, or additional explicit images in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information. (Sextortion).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

11.12. [If Q10.12 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone using editing software or other tools to place one person's face onto another's body or other similar actions (Shallow fake).

- Not at all often
- Not very often
- Somewhat often
- Very often
- Difficult to answer

12. In the last 12 months, to what extent have you personally experienced and/or witnessed the following behaviours used to target women online?

12.1. [If Q10.1 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone sharing or threatening to share private information

about an individual online (Doxing).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.2. [If Q10.2 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone sharing or threatening to share offensive or sexually

explicit images/videos of an individual online (Image-based abuse).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.3. [If Q10.3 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone threatening physical violence online against an

individual or their relatives (Cybermob).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.4. [If Q10.4 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone sending or posting messages to undermine an

individual's self-esteem or reputation (Cyberbullying).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.5. [If Q10.5 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone stealing an individual's password and/or accessing

their online accounts, Internet devices, etc. (Online impersonation).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.6. [If Q10.6 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone using an individual's online accounts, or creating

an account using their identity (Online impersonation).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.7. [If Q10.7 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone, using sexist or hateful language toward an

individual online (Online harassment).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else

- Difficult to answer

12.8. [If Q10.8 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone spreading false information about an individual

and/or defaming them online (Cyberbullying).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.9. [If Q10.9 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone creating a negative campaign about an individual

online (Cybermob).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.10. [If Q10.10 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone sending threatening emails, spreading rumors

online, identity theft, or tracking an individual's internet activity (repeated behaviors) (Cyberstalking).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.11. [If Q10.11 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone using electronic means demanding money, sexual

acts, or additional explicit images in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information. (Sextortion).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

12.12. [If Q10.12 = slightly aware, moderately aware or very aware] Someone using editing software or other tools to place

one person's face onto another's body or other similar actions (Shallowfake).

- Have personally experienced it
- Know someone who was targeted
- Have witnessed it happening to someone else
- Have neither experienced nor witnessed it happening to someone else
- Difficult to answer

13. In the last 12 months, on what types of online platforms did you most often experience and/or see these kinds of behaviours being used to target women? Select all that apply.

- Social networks (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc.)
- Photo/Video sharing (YouTube, Pinterest etc.)
- Blogging/Community (News.am, Myinfo.am, etc.)
- Messaging services (Messenger, WhatsApp, Viber, Telegram, etc.)
- Dating apps (Tinder, Berve, etc.)
- Email
- Other (please specify)
- Difficult to answer

14. [If Q12.X=personally experienced] Thinking of the last 12 months, how often did you personally experience these kinds of behaviours (above mentioned)?

- Rarely

- Sometimes
- Often
- Always
- Difficult to answer

15. [If Q12.X=personally experienced] Please indicate the gender of the individual(s) targeting you.

- Male
- Female
- Both male and female

16. [If Q12.X=personally experienced] When you have personally experienced these kinds of behaviours, what kind of relationship did you have with the person or people targeting you? Select all that apply.

- Someone or people that I know from offline
- Someone or people that I know from online
- Someone or people previously unknown to me
- Anonymous user(s)
- Other, please specify
- Refuse to answer

16.1. If other, provide your own answer.

17. [If Q12.X=personally experienced] What were the most significant impacts, if any, resulting from your experience(s) with these behaviours? Select all that apply.

- Thought twice about posting again
- Reduced my online presence
- Blocked contacts
- Created a new/private profile
- Stopped using that online platform
- Changed my mobile number
- Reported the behaviour to the online platform
- Reported the behaviour to an offline protective agency
- Felt unsafe
- Family felt unsafe
- Experienced mental health or emotional harm
- Experienced offline physical harm
- Felt humiliated/embarrassed
- Lost or had to change my job
- Caused harm to a personal relationship
- Other (please specify)
- Difficult to answer/Refuse to answer

17.1. If other, provide your own answer.

18. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Select one for each row.

18.1 I am more cautious about what I post online out of fear of being targeted.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer

18.2 The Internet is a safe place for me to share my opinions and ideas.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer

18.3 Social media platforms should do more to address women being negatively targeted online.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer

18.4 Women are more often targets of cyber harassment than men.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer

18.5 More needs to be done to protect women from being negatively targeted online.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer

18.6 There is little women can do once they are targeted online to get help or to put a stop to it.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer

18.7 I worry about negative online behaviour from others impacting my real life.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer

18.8 Women often don't know that these negative online behaviours are reportable.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer.

18.9 Women have become accustomed to being negatively targeted online, because nothing is done to stop it.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer.

18.10 I know where I can safely report negative online behavior targeting women when I experience or observe it.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer.

18.11 The Internet can be a helpful source of information and support for women dealing with these kinds of negative online behaviours.

- Strongly disagree
- Somewhat disagree

- Somewhat agree
- Strongly agree
- Difficult to answer.

19. What guidance would you give to other women like yourself about how to protect themselves against being negatively targeted online? Select all that apply.

- Keep your profile/information private
- Don't post information that allows someone to locate you
- Don't give out your phone number or email address
- Immediately report someone who makes you feel uncomfortable
- Tell others within your network(s) about the person targeting you and their behaviour
- Seek help from an offline protection agency, if needed
- Keep records of the targeting, like messages, images, etc.
- Other
- Difficult to answer

19.1. If other, provide your own answer.

[TFGBV in Business] IF Q6=Manager, Entrepreneur

20. How frequently do you use the Internet for your business-related activities? Select one.

- Several times a day
- Once a day
- Several times a week
- Once a week
- Several times a month [TERMINATE]
- Once a month or less [TERMINATE]

21. Have you ever faced any form of cyberbullying or online harassment in relation to your entrepreneurial activities? Please select one.

- Yes
- No

22. [If Q21=yes] How did you respond to cyberbullying or online harassment? Please select all that apply.

- Ignored it
- Reported it to the platform or website
- Blocked the perpetrator(s)
- Sought support from friends or family
- Sought legal assistance
- Changed privacy settings on social media accounts
- Other

22.1. If other, provide your own answer.

23. Have you ever received unsolicited or inappropriate messages or comments from clients, customers, or business partners online? Please select one.

- Yes
- No

24. If yes, how did you handle these unsolicited or inappropriate messages or comments? Please select all that apply.

- Ignored them
- Responded directly to address the issue
- Blocked the sender
- Reported the incident to relevant authorities or platforms
- Took legal action
- Other

24.1. If other, provide your own answer.

25. How concerned are you about the potential impact of technology-facilitated gender-based violence on your entrepreneurial activities? Select one.

- Not concerned at all
- Slightly concerned
- Moderately concerned
- Very concerned
- Extremely concerned

26. Do you believe that technology platforms and social media companies are doing enough to prevent and address gender-based violence targeting women entrepreneurs? Select one.

- Yes
- No
- Unsure

27. Have you ever experienced any instances of online sabotage, such as negative reviews or false allegations, specifically aimed at damaging your business reputation? Please select one.

- Yes
- No

28. If yes, how did you address these instances of online sabotage? Please select all that apply.

- Gave a public response
- Contacted the platform or website to dispute the false claims
- Engaged with satisfied customers to counterbalance the negative feedback
- Sought legal advice or assistance
- Implemented new strategies for reputation management online
- Other

28.1. If other, provide your own answer.

29. Do you feel that being a woman entrepreneur makes you more vulnerable to online harassment or discrimination compared to male entrepreneurs? Select one.

- Yes
- No
- Difficult to respond

30. How do you perceive the role of gender stereotypes or biases in influencing the occurrence of technology-facilitated gender-based violence against women entrepreneurs? Please share your thoughts.

31. Have you ever faced any challenges or barriers in accessing support or assistance when dealing with instances of technology-facilitated gender-based violence in relation to your entrepreneurial activities? Please share your experiences.

32. Have you ever refrained from speaking out about instances of online harassment or gender-based violence targeting you as a woman entrepreneur due to fear of retaliation or further victimization? Please select one.

- Yes
- No

33. If yes, what factors contributed to your decision to remain silent about the online harassment or violence? Please select all that apply.

- Concerns about damaging my business reputation further
- Fear of facing legal repercussions for speaking out
- Lack of trust in the effectiveness of reporting mechanisms or authorities
- Fear of retaliation from the perpetrator(s)
- Feeling isolated or unsupported in addressing the issue
- Other

33.1. If other, provide your own answer.

34. Which of the following ranges best represents your household income?

- Up to 99,999 AMD
- 100,000-249,000 AMD
- 250,000-499,999 AMD
- 500,000-999,999 AMD
- 1,000,000-2,499,999 AMD
- Difficult to answer
- Refuse to answer

35. Including yourself, how many people live in your household?

36. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, the highest degree received. *Select one.*

- Higher or postgraduate
- Middle vocational
- Vocational training
- Middle/high school
- No professional education
- Refuse to answer

37. What is your marital status? *Select one.*

- Single (never married)
- Married, or in a domestic partnership
- Widowed
- Divorced or Separated

14. Annex C: Survey Results

Awareness of Online Targeting Behaviors (N=364)

Figure 15.1. Someone sharing or threatening to share private information about an individual online.




Figure 15.2. Someone sharing or threatening to share offensive or sexually explicit images/videos of an individual online.




Figure 15.3. Someone threatening physical violence online against an individual or their relatives.




Figure 15.4. Someone sending or posting messages to undermine an individual's self-esteem or reputation.




Figure 15.5. Someone stealing an individual's password and/ or accessing their online accounts, Internet devices, etc.

Figure 15.6. Someone using an individual's online accounts or creating an account using their identity.

AWARENESS RATE: 78%




Figure 15.7. Someone, using sexist or hateful language toward an individual online.

AWARENESS RATE: 74.7%




Figure 15.8. Someone spreading false information about an individual and/or defaming them online.

AWARENESS RATE: 74.3%




Figure 15.9. Someone creating a negative campaign about an individual online.




Figure 15.10. Someone sending threatening emails, spreading rumors online, identity theft, or tracking an individual's internet activity (repeated behaviors).

AWARENESS RATE: 74.7%




Figure 15.11. Someone using electronic means demanding money, sexual acts, or additional explicit images in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information.

AWARENESS RATE: 68.1%






Figure 15.12. Someone using editing software or other tools to place one person's face onto another's body or other similar actions.

AWARENESS RATE: 66.7%



AWARENESS RATE: 63.2%



**Frequency of Online Targeting Behaviors
(N=364)**

Figure 15.13. Someone sharing or threatening to share private information about an individual online. (N=234)




Figure 15.14. Someone sharing or threatening to share offensive or sexually explicit images/videos of an individual online. (N=250)




Figure 15.15 Someone threatening physical violence online against an individual or their relatives. (N=214)




Figure 15.16 Someone sending or posting messages to undermine an individual's self-esteem or reputation. (N=253)




Figure 15.17 Someone stealing an individual's password and/ or accessing their online accounts, Internet devices, etc. (N=268)




Figure 15.18 Someone using an individual's online accounts or creating an account using their identity. (N=272)




Figure 15.19 Someone, using sexist or hateful language toward an individual online. (N=270)




Figure 15.20 Someone spreading false information about an individual and/or defaming them online. (N=284)




Figure 15.21 Someone creating a negative campaign about an individual online. (N=272)




Figure 15.22 Someone sending threatening emails, spreading rumors online, identity theft, or tracking an individual's internet activity (repeated behaviors). (N=248)




Figure 15.23 Someone using electronic means demanding money, sexual acts, or additional explicit images in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information. (N=243)





Figure 15.24 Someone using editing software or other tools to place one person's face onto another's body or other similar actions. (N=230)



Awareness of Online Targeting Behaviors by Age Group (N=364)

Figure 15.25. Sharing or threatening to share private information about an individual online.




Figure 15.26. Sharing or threatening to share offensive or sexually explicit images/videos of an individual online.




Figure 15.27. Threatening physical violence online against an individual or their relatives.

Figure 15.28. Sending or posting messages to undermine an individual's self-esteem or reputation.



Figure 15.29. Stealing an individual's password and/ or accessing their online accounts, Internet devices, etc.

Figure 15.30. Using an individual's online accounts or creating an account using their identity.




Figure 15.31. Using sexist or hateful language toward an individual online.




Figure 15.32. Spreading false information about an individual and/or defaming them online.




Figure 15.33. Creating a negative campaign about an individual online.




Figure 15.34. Sending threatening emails, spreading rumors online, identity theft, or tracking an individual's internet activity (repeated behaviors).




Figure 15.35. Using electronic means demanding money, sexual acts, or additional explicit images in exchange for not exposing intimate images or private information.






Figure 15.36. Using editing software or other tools to place one person's face onto another's body or other similar actions.







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